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Emotional intelligence (EI) refers to the competence to identify and express emotions, 
understand emotions, assimilate emotions in thought, and regulate both positive and 
negative emotions in oneself and others.  EI is a necessary, but not fully sufficient, 
quality Green Berets must possess to establish, nurture, and enhance effective 
relationships within the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational arena.  
As the Special Forces Regiment transitions from intensive participation in operations 
supporting the Global War on Terrorism to developing the forward-focused Global 
Special Operations Forces Network, thickening these critical relationships emerges as the 
foundation of any expected future success. This thesis strives to elucidate the substantial 
scientific evidence establishing EI as a critical and well-deserving addition to the 
traditional measures of competence, such as intelligence quotients and general 
personality. Specifically, the author demonstrates that the skills and abilities associated 
with EI were deemed most critical by the Office of Strategic Services assessment staff, 
and that these same skills remain key competencies for accomplishing partner-based 
special operations today. The author recommends practical changes to the current 
assessment and selection of Special Forces personnel, as well as for the training and 
placement of selected Soldiers.  
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I. PREFACE: A TRIBUTE TO BALANCE 
We are not often encouraged or provided the opportunity to take an exit ramp off 
the busy highways and byways of our day-to-day lives. Our schedules are full of early 
morning mandatories, mid-day musts, afternoon obligations, and nightly necessities. As 
we hustle from one requirement to the next, eating away at the remaining balance of the 
day, we frequently neglect to care for the truly essential: our families, our friends, and 
ourselves. We pour out until there is often nothing left, finding a bit more to pour out 
again the next day, until the deficit is too significant to ignore. Whether our nature results 
in our bodies slowing to an almost abrupt halt or accelerating at full speed until we crash, 
the result is the same: mission failure. And in almost every case, whether through self-
reflection or observation of others, we recognize the common culprit hiding in the 
shadows. His name is different for everyone, but his characteristics are the same: too 
much of this, and not enough of that. Our lives demand balance, but that is easier written 
than done. 
This thesis explores the middle way, the land between objective and subjective, 
thought and feeling, and outer and inner life. It strives to compel a shift toward the center. 
It acknowledges that there are those who distrust feelings and are uncomfortable with 
expressing their emotions, opting rather to remain rational and analytical, holding the 
world at arm’s length. To those who find themselves in this camp, this exploration will 
encourage you to balance logic with feelings, bringing depth and a vibrance to life that is 
unattainable without emotion. To their opposites, those who are well-described as subject 
to the mercies of emotion, being compelled to go where the winds of feeling blow, then 
this journey will teach them that they “do not need fewer emotions; they need deeper and 
more truly authentic ones. . . . They also need to learn to embrace critical thinking, by 
which feelings can be judged and reality more firmly embraced.”1  Balance of thought 
and emotion is the middle way, the path we must follow to reach the Global SOF 
Networked world of 2020 and beyond.    
                                                 
1 David G. Benner, Surrender to Love: Discovering the Heart of Christian Spirituality (Downer’s 
Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2003), 31. 
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My own research journey has challenged some of my most deeply-seated beliefs 
and expanded my understanding about relationships, leadership, professional military 
service, and love. One of my hopes is that you, as a participant in this adventure, will 
incorporate blocks of time to intentionally reflect, as I have, on matters of the heart. 
Sentimentalism is not what I seek, as it is a counterfeit version of authentic emotional 
experience, which cheapens the encounter and limits the rewards of genuine self-
discovery and expression. As Psalm 42:7 recognizes that “deep calls to deep,” so too is 
my hope that this co-exploration will draw you into the depths of the human experience, 
awaking in you a desire to become present and intentional in every relationship. To be 
clear then, this thesis is essentially a tribute to balance, and requires your active 
participation as a reader to advance our collective understanding and appreciation for the 
emotional dimension of intelligence and its role in developing friendships. 
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II. INTRODUCTION 
“Who succeeds in forming and leading a Great Group?  He or she is almost 
always a pragmatic dreamer. They are people who get things done, but they are 
people with immortal longings. Often, they are scientifically minded people with 
poetry in their souls. . . . They are always people with an original vision. A dream 
is at the heart of every Great Group.”2 
Although this thesis focuses on the importance of emotional intelligence (EI) and 
the role it ought to play in thickening the Global Special Operations Forces (SOF) 
Network, it also strives to recognize that EI is one of dozens of other necessary, but not 
solely sufficient, competencies required to accomplish the mission. As the Special Forces 
(SF) Regiment re-aligns its activities to meet the demands of tomorrow, SF operators, as 
the practitioners of peace, need to remember that SOF culture is a reflection of collective 
priorities. If appreciating balance finds its way into “commander’s intent, key tasks, and 
desired end state,” then the force will thrive, strengthened by the supportive bonds of 
cared-for families, friends, and fellow Green Berets.  “In the end,” as the USSOCOM 
2020 guidance relates, “our success is ultimately rooted in how well we take care of our 
most precious resource—the SOF warriors and their families.”3  SOF warriors, who have 
taken the time and who have been intentional about caring for themselves and their 
families, are more able to pour out of their abundance service to others.  Understanding 
that the emotional dimension is an integral component of a warrior’s overall health and 
well-being, it is imperative to investigate the role, if any, emotional intelligence plays in 
accomplishing SF missions today, in 2020, and beyond. 
Before offering a brief outline and describing the inspiration of this work, it is 
necessary to acknowledge that the science and vast implications of EI are well beyond the 
scope and grasp of this thesis.  In many ways, this work scratches only the surface. 
Despite its cursory nature, however, it does reveal that EI skills and abilities are 
                                                 
2 Warren Bennis and Patricia Ward Biederman, Organizing Genius: The Secrets of Creative 
Collaboration (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1998), 14. 
3 United States Special Operations Command 2020: Forging the Tip of the Spear, 2, 
http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/SOCOM2020Strategy.pdf (accessed May 15, 
2013). 
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assessable, trainable, and learnable, and are necessary for developing and sustaining 
partnerships—an essential task for every Green Beret. 
Enhancing the Special Forces Regiment is this work’s central interest. The 
inspiration to study emotions, and emotional intelligence and its application to the 
military profession stemmed from a comment the author’s Group Commander made to 
him in 2012. He insisted that the special operations community would greatly benefit 
from having more officers who possessed high emotional intelligence. At the time, the 
concept of EI was almost completely foreign to the author, except in its use as a phrase 
describing someone of maturity and level-headedness. Although these attributes are 
associated with EI, they certainly do not describe it fully.  To satisfy that need, the initial 
portion of this thesis looks at the history and science of EI, and the role of emotions in 
decision-making in general. Although somewhat clinical, the literature review is 
fundamental in that it establishes a common operating picture of how the human brain 
processes emotions.  Properly oriented toward emotions in general, the literature review 
gives way to the heart of the thesis, a careful comparison between how a historical special 
operations organization, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), incorporated emotional 
competencies, and how current SOF handle EI.   
Ideally, this thesis would include a review of the role, if any, EI played in the 
assessment and selection of Green Berets in the past. However, no comprehensive review 
or detailed study of Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS) exists that includes 
emotional intelligence, yet one does exist for the OSS and the assessment of operatives, 
spies, and saboteurs during World War II.  Considering the close connection between the 
OSS and the SF Regiment, the second portion of this thesis provides a detailed review of 
the OSS assessment methodology and the selected variables that closely relate to EI.   
Correspondingly, the third section of this thesis focuses on how emotional 
intelligence is related to thickening the Global SOF Network—the critical task set before 
the special operations community.  
 5 
In an effort to encourage further study, the final chapter focuses on 
recommendations for selection, training, and placement of Green Berets; it also 
highlights two additional areas that complement EI—networks and trust. 
This thesis is written generally as a comparison between how the OSS of World 
War II regarded EI and how the special operations community of today handles it.  The 
literature review describes the science of EI and establishes the idea of balance as the 
synthesis of emotion and cognition, the pairing required to build, maintain, and nurture 
relationships.  Love and authentic concern for, and care of, friends are critical outputs of 
a balanced approach to partnerships.  Although essential components of friendship, 
incorporating the analysis and description of these outputs is beyond the limited scope of 
this thesis.  Rather, this thesis attempts to pay close attention to the inputs and 
throughputs of emotion in military partnerships, which, when well-understood and 
managed, collectively describe aspects of EI.  Understanding the importance of EI’s role 
in the day-to-day effort of partnering friendships in military networks made the 
comparison between the OSS and SOF a natural vehicle from which to explore how 
effectively an organization may understand and incorporate the emotional dimension.  
The comparison also renders a compelling argument that the special operations 
community today undervalues the role of emotional competence, demonstrated through 
SFAS’s limited assessment of candidates’ EI, the absence of emotion-centric training, the 
overlooking of EI in the placement of operators, and the disregarding of EI-related skills 
and abilities in talent management. 
As the quote at the beginning of this section suggests, transforming the Global 
SOF Network into a “Great Group” of like-minded professionals requires an original 
vision, and a dream infused with immortal longings. The heart and cadence of the special 
operations community require the drumbeat of balance between cognition and emotion, 
keeping time to the rhythm inspired by intelligent Soldiers who are capable of 
understanding their own emotions and the emotions of others, and who appropriately 
assimilate those emotions into thought and action. Such Soldiers are capable of 
developing and nurturing friendships with willing and capable partners to thwart the 
enemy’s efforts. Only in balance, with adequate measures of professional and personal 
 6 
competencies, can SOF expect to achieve the mission with well selected, trained, and 
placed individuals. This thesis is intended to further the ongoing dialogue about EI within 
the special operations community, and encourage individuals to explore the depths of the 
emotional dimension within the human domain.      
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. SOF 2020: YOU CANNOT SURGE TRUST 
As the Special Forces Regiment transitions from intensive participation in 
operations supporting the Global War on Terrorism, to developing the forward-focused 
worldwide SOF Network, the importance of establishing, nurturing, and enhancing 
effective relationships within the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational 
(JIIM) arena emerges as the foundation of any expected future success. During the Aspen 
Security Forum in July 2012, Admiral William McRaven, Commander, U.S. Special 
Operations Command, in addressing a question about training foreign partners, 
emphasized the importance of understanding the “human domain.”  He stated, “We’re 
learning what their culture is, so next time we come back in, they understand who we are, 
[and] we understand who they are. You’ve got to build that trust. You can’t surge trust.”4  
The recent inclusion of the term “human domain” invites those within the special 
operations community to dive into the deep waters of the human experience and explore 
the powerful nature of emotions and the role they play in developing relationships built 
on trust. 
Building enduring partnerships is the cornerstone of any Green Beret’s 
professional endeavors. Friendships are built on trust, which is earned through the 
intentional pursuit of unity through mutual support. Trust consists of two primary 





                                                 
4 William H. McRaven, as cited in David Trulio – “You Can’t Surge Trust – Insights from the 
Opening of the Aspen Security Forum.” http://securitydebrief.com/2012/07/27/you-cant-surge-trust-
insights-from-the-opening-of-the-aspen-security-forum/#axzz2lhHoqIg6  (accessed February 11, 2013). 
5 Rebecca E. Rehfeld, “Organizational Trust & Emotional Intelligence: An Appreciative Inquiry into 
the Language of the Twenty-First Century Leader,” UMI Dissertations Publishing, 2002, 67. UMO No. 
3034480. 
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Together, these components develop confidence between individuals, within teams, and 
throughout organizations. The comprehensive goal of developing the Global SOF 
Network inspires a question—how should we begin?  Frederick W. Faber once noted that  
“many a friendship—long, loyal, and self-sacrificing—rested at first upon no thicker a 
foundation than a kind word.”6  Genuine kindness is critical, but it is not the essential 
quality needed to ensure friendships are both capacious and dependable.  Developing 
friendships that are long, loyal, and self-sacrificing would enhance the Regiment’s ability 
to defend and advance national interests.  However, such friendships require further 
exposition and collective ownership.   
Building and thickening the global SOF community demands a common unity of 
purpose, language, and intent, and signals a sharp departure from unilateral actions. 
Recent strategic guidance redirects Department of Defense (DoD) efforts toward the 
Asia-Pacific region, while maintaining focused efforts throughout Europe, Africa, and the 
Middle East.7  The majority of international partners that reside in conflict rich regions, 
such as Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, are culturally collectivistic, emphasizing 
“conformity to group norms, interconnectedness, relational harmony, and concern for in-
group interests.”8  Such cultures, as Bernard Mayer suggests, favor developing emotion-





                                                 
6 Frederick William Faber, http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/f/frederickw556266.html 
(accessed February 11, 2013). 
7 Defense Strategic Guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense 
(January 2012), http://www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf (accessed February 22, 
2013); National Security Strategy (May, 2010), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed February 
22, 2013); and The National Military Strategy of the United States of America: Redefining America’s 
Military Leadership (February 2011), http://www.jcs.mil/content/files/2011–
02/020811084800_2011_NMS_-_08_FEB_2011.pdf (accessed February 22, 2013). 
8 Michael L. Spangle and Myra W. Isenhart, Negotiation: Communication in Diverse Settings 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2003), 369. 
 9 
convictions that partnerships can be harnessed through common cognitive and reason-
based interests.9  As Rushworth Kidder suggests, truly important relationships are not 
transactional (Western), but emanate from shared values and understanding.10  This  
reality represents a collision of cultures, and presents an obstacle and opportunity for the 
Special Forces Regiment to hone friendship-building skills and abilities through detailed 
study, increased knowledge, and effective practice.   
Ralph Waldo Emerson noted that the two primary components of friendship are 
truth and tenderness.11  He poetically combined man’s cognitive and emotional streams 
into one mighty river, illustrating the necessary convergence of both forms of intelligence 
in developing and enjoying true friendships.  Consequently, one should be truthful 
through tenderness, or, as the Bible suggests, “Speaking the truth in love.”12  When 
discussing the moral component of society, Sissela Bok suggests that truth-telling 
promotes trust, which “functions as a foundation of relations among human beings.”13  
Although trust is centrally located in the military lexicon, tenderness and love are found 
only on the periphery, if at all. Despite the discomfort that may accompany discussing 
such terms, it is imperative to make the connection: the most effective relationships, 
whether between husband and wife or Special Operations Liaison Officer (SOLO) and 
Chief of Mission (COM), require the emotional stream of tenderness and love to  
 
 
                                                 
9 Bernard Mayer, The Dynamics of Conflict: A Guide to Engagement and Intervention, 2nd ed. (San 
Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2012), 95.  This assertion is explored and supported in subsequent sections, 
primarily in the cross-cultural analysis provided in Chapter V, 50–53. 
10 Rushworth M. Kidder, How Good People Make Tough Choices: Resolving the Dilemmas of Ethical 
Living (New York, NY: Harper Collins Publishers Inc., 1995), 231. 
11 Ralph Waldo Emerson, The Selected Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed. Brooks Atkinson (New 
York, NY: Random House, 1940), 228–229. 
12 Ephesians 4:15 (New International Version). 
13 Sissela Bok, Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life, 2nd Ed (New York, NY: Vintage 
Books, 1999), 31. 
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encourage trust, support, and dependability. As Emerson concludes, “I do not wish to 
treat friendships daintily, but with roughest courage. When they are real, they are not 
glass threads or frostwork, but the solidest thing we know.”14 
If building relationships is so essential to the Special Forces mission, then it 
stands to reason that selection and placement criteria, as well as training modules, are 
needed to guide and inform this critical mission component. However, careful analysis of 
doctrine indicates that little or no emphasis is placed on selecting or training Green Berets 
on the development, understanding, and importance of emotions in self or others.15  
Although recognition of its significance via a field of study is younger than the average 
Green Beret, the concept of EI provides a new lens for viewing the critically important 
task of building effective relationships. Generally speaking, EI refers to the competence 
to identify and express emotions, understand emotions, assimilate emotions in thought, 
and regulate both positive and negative emotions in oneself and others. 
B. THE HISTORY AND CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING EMOTIONAL 
INTELLIGENCE 
Since its first presentation as a separate intelligence in 1990 by Peter Salovey and 
John Mayer, the veracity of emotional intelligence has been challenged and advanced in 
                                                 
14 Emerson, The Selected Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson, 228. 
15 Amanda Shipman, Tamara Friedrich, Brandon Vessey, Shane Connelly, Eric Day, Alyssa 
Douglass, . . . & Gregory A. Ruark, A Model of Emotion Management for U.S. Army, Research Product 
2011–03 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social 
Sciences, 2010); Seth Kaplan, Jose Cortina, Gregory A. Ruark, Kara Orvis, Katie Engel, & Krista 
Langkamer, Emotions at Work: Leader Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities to Enhance Soldier Performance, 
Technical Report 1302 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral 
and Social Sciences, 2012); Gerald F. Sewell, “Emotional Intelligence and the Army Leadership 
Requirements Model,” Military Review 89, no. 6 (November–December 2009): 93–98, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/225300131/fulltextPDF?accountid=12702 (accessed February 15, 
2013); Robert B. Lackey, “Emotional Intelligence Training: A Missing Element in our Army,” Fires (July-
August 2011): 38-45, http://search.proquest.com/docview/896467697/fulltextPDF?accountid=12702 
(accessed February 15, 2013); and Holly Livingstone, Maria Nadjiwon-Foster, and Sonya Smithers, 
Emotional Intelligence & Military Leadership, Minister of National Defence (Her Majesty the Queen in 
Right of Canada, 2002), 
http://www.raf.mod.uk/pmdair/rafcms/mediafiles/225C29C0_5056_A318_A8A6D465091F140C.pdf 
(accessed March 8, 2013). 
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both academic and commercial circles.16  Broadly, there exist three distinct emotional 
intelligence constructs substantive enough to merit attention. The first, created by 
Salovey and Mayer, is based on abilities and is measured by both consensus and expert 
evaluation.17  Two tests, the Multifactor Emotional Intelligence Scale (MEIS) and the 
Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT), evaluate the construct’s 
four branches: 1) perception of emotion, 2) integration and assimilation of emotion, 3) 
knowledge about emotions, and 4) management of emotions.   
The second construct evaluates mixed traits through peer and self-reporting that 
overlap with at least four of the Big Five personality dimensions, which are openness, 
                                                 
16 Catherine S. Daus and Neal M. Ashkanasy, “The Case for the Ability-Based Model of Emotional 
Intelligence in Organizational Behavior,” Journal of Organizational Behavior 26, no. 4 (June 2005): 453–
466, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4093840 (accessed January 28, 2013); John D. Mayer, Peter Salovey, and 
David R. Caruso, “Emotional Intelligence: Theory, Findings, and Implications,” Psychological Inquiry 15, 
no. 3 (2004a): 197–215, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20447229 (accessed February 15, 2013); F. William 
Brown and Dan Moshavi, “Transformational Leadership and Emotional Intelligence: A Potential Pathway 
for an Increased Understanding of Interpersonal Influence,” Journal of Organizational Behavior 26, no. 7 
(November 2005): 867–871, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4093959 (accessed January 28, 2013); Edwin A. 
Locke, “Why Emotional Intelligence is an Invalid Concept,” Journal of Organizational Behavior 26, no. 4 
(June 2005): 425–431, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4093837 (accessed January 28, 2013); Frank J. Landy, 
“Some Historical and Scientific Issues Related to Research of Emotional Intelligence,” Journal of 
Organizational Behavior 26, no. 4 (June 2005): 411–424, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4093836 (accessed 
January 28, 2013); Jeffrey M. Conte, “A Review and Critique of Emotional Intelligence Measures,” 
Journal of Organizational Behavior 26, no. 4 (June 2005): 433–440, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4093838 
(accessed January 28, 2013); Frank Krueger, Aaron K. Barbey, Kevin Mccabe, Maren Strenziok, Giovanna 
Zamboni, Jeffrey Solomon, . . . and Vernon Smith, “The Neural Bases of Key Competencies of Emotional 
Intelligence,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 106, no. 52 
(2009): 22488, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40536471 (accessed January 28, 2013); Peter Salovey and John 
D. Mayer, “Emotional Intelligence,” Imagination, Cognition, and Personality 9 (1990): 185–211, 
http://www.unh.edu/emotional_intelligence/EIAssets/EmotionalIntelligenceProper/EI1990%20Emotional%
20Intelligence.pdf (accessed February 15, 2013); Jacob Joseph, Kevin Berry, and Satish P. Deshpande, 
“Impact of Emotional Intelligence and Other Factors on Perception of Ethical Behavior of Peers,” Journal 
of Business Ethics 89, no. 4 (November 2009): 539–546, http://www.jstor.org/stable/27735210 (accessed 
January 28, 2013); and Ernest H. O’Boyle Jr., Ronald H. Humphrey, Jeffrey M. Pollack, Thomas H. 
Hawver, and Paul A. Story, “The Relation between Emotional Intelligence and Job Performance: A Meta-
Analysis,” Journal of Organizational Behavior 32, no. 5 (2001): 788–818, 
http://web.ebscohost.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=2c7ad2d7-c9d1–4257–83df-
991ffc7eadbb%40sessionmgr111&vid=2&hid=128 (accessed January 28, 2013). 
17 Salovey and Mayer, “Emotional Intelligence;” Mayer, John D. Mayer, Peter Salovey, and David R. 
Caruso, “A Further Consideration of the Issues of Emotional Intelligence,” Psychological Inquiry 15, no. 3 
(2004b): 249–255, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20447235 (accessed February 15, 2013); Daus and 
Ashkanasy, “The Case for the Ability-Based Model of Emotional Intelligence in Organizational Behavior;” 
and Gerald Matthews, Moshe Zeidner, and Richard D. Roberts, Emotional Intelligence: Science and Myth 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), 9–28 and 180–204. 
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conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism.18  Daniel Goleman 
created this test, commonly known as the ECI (Emotional Competence Inventory), to 
assess emotional competencies and positive social behavior through four discrete 
clusters: 1) self-awareness, 2) social awareness, 3) self-management, and 4) social skills.   
The third construct, created by Reuven Bar-On, produces an overall score as well 
as scores for five composite scales: 1) intrapersonal, 2) interpersonal, 3) adaptability, 4) 
general mood, and 5) stress management.19  Also based on mixed traits, Bar-On’s 
Emotional Quotient Inventory (EQ-I) popularized the concept of EQ, and, along with 
Goleman’s ECI, spawned numerous commercial offshoots that promise measurable 
improvement in areas as broad as leadership and job performance, as well as for 
enhancing or rebuilding broken relationships.20  All three constructs point to the role 
emotions play in enhancing one’s composite intelligence, and link what happens inside 
one’s mind with what happens outside through relationships and the environment. 
Despite the evidence supporting emotion’s role in increasing composite intelligence, and 
thus boosting an individual’s effectiveness in relating to his environment, scholars have 
historically undersold the relevance and importance of emotions in comparison to reason. 
                                                 
18 For further information about the BFF see one of the following: Daniel Goleman, Emotional 
Intelligence (New York: Bantam Books, 1995), 78–126; Daniel Goleman, The Brain and Emotional 
Intelligence: New Insights (Northampton, MA: More than Sound, LLC, 2011); Daniel Goleman, Richard 
Boyatzis, and Annie McKee, Primal Leadership: Realizing the Power of Emotional Intelligence (Boston, 
MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2002), 30–31, 38, 48–50, and 255; Annie McKee, Richard Boyatzis, 
and Frances Johnston, Becoming a Resonant Leader (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2008); 
Conte, “A Review and Critique of Emotional Intelligence Measures;” and Matthews, Zeidner and Roberts, 
Emotional Intelligence. 
19 Conte, “A Review and Critique of Emotional Intelligence Measures,” and Matthews, Zeidner and 
Roberts, Emotional Intelligence. 
20 Adele B. Lynn, The EQ Difference: A Powerful Plan for Putting Emotional Intelligence to Work 
(New York, NY: American Management Association, 2005); Hendrie Weisinger, Emotional Intelligence at 
Work: The Untapped Edge for Success (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1998); Steve Simmons 
and John C. Simmons, Jr., Measuring Emotional Intelligence: The Ground Breaking Guide to Applying the 
Principles of Emotional Intelligence (Arlington, TX: The Summit Publishing Group, 1997); Goleman, 
Boyatzis, and McKee, Primal Leadership; McKee, Boyatzis, and Johnston, Becoming a Resonant Leader; 
Kaplan, et al., Emotions at Work; and Shipman, et al., A Model of Emotion Management. 
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C. MARRIAGE OF REASON AND EMOTION 
Subsequently, reason and rational thought enjoy a seemingly permanent 
privileged status, while emotion is often denigrated to a second class status in decision-
making. At the core, “rationality is privileged because [mankind] wants to be rational.”21  
Additionally, we elevate rationality because we want it to tell us what to do.22  
Conversely, John Elster explains that emotions are devalued because they are “seen 
mainly as sources of irrationality and as obstacles to a well-ordered life.”23  This seems 
to resonate with the Stoics’ maxim that reason – that which separates man from animals – 
was nearly synonymous with virtue. As defined by Zeno and Chrysippus, virtue was “a 
disposition and faculty of the governing principle of the soul brought into being by 
reason, or rather: reason itself, consistent, firm and unwavering.”24  The Stoics believed 
that emotions corrupted reason, serving as non-assented judgments of action.25  
Supported by a history of antagonistic views toward emotion, the majority of EI 
opponents today reason that emotions cannot and should not constitute a separate field of 
intelligence.   
Edwin Locke suggests that one cannot “reason with emotion” and claims that the 
ultimate motive for establishing EI as equal to cognitive intelligence (IQ) is egalitarian: 
“redefining what it means to be intelligent so that everyone will, in some form, be equal 
                                                 
21 John Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Studies in the Limitation of Rationality (Cambridge, MA: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989b). 
22 John Elster, “Some Unresolved Problems in the Theory of Rational Behavior,” Acta Sociologica 
(Taylor & Francis Ltd) 36, no. 3 (1993): 179–190, 
http://web.ebscohost.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=d5ac4d65-46c4-4856-b3c4-
087768c3959a%40sessionmgr114&vid=2&hid=114 (accessed August 30, 2012). 
23 John Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 
1989a). 
24 Plutarch, De virt. Mor. 3, 441c., as cited in A. A. Long, “The Logical Basis of Stoic Ethics,” 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series 71 (1970 – 1971): 95, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4544803 (accessed April 17, 2013). See also Seneca, Letters 76.9–10: “What is 
best in man?  Reason: with this he precedes the animals and follows the gods. Therefore, perfect reason is 
man’s peculiar good, the rest he shares with animals and plants. . . . Reason – which when right and perfect 
makes the full sum of human happiness. . . . This perfect reason is called virtue and it is identical to 
rectitude.” 
25 John Sellars, Stoicism (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2006), 114–119. 
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in intelligence to everyone else.”26  Additionally, Frank Landy argues that EI is so 
broadly defined, encompassing existing constructs, such as academic intelligence, 
personality, tacit or procedural knowledge, technical knowledge, and experience, that it 
does not sufficiently add to the explanation or prediction of common outcomes.27  
Finally, Jeffrey Conte criticizes both the measurement and psychometric properties of 
emotional intelligence. He argues that the current EI tests fail to identify what is 
measured, making it difficult to examine content validity. Furthermore, he suggests that 
researchers’ inability to converge on a single construct indicates a lack of scientific proof 
that should generate more research and experimentation.28 
Although opponents’ arguments need to be addressed, most notably the lack of 
agreement on a basic definition and construct, the body of evidence supporting emotional 
intelligence is expansive and compelling. In support of EI, Mayer, Salovey, and David 
Caruso posit that “emotion problems, more so than the usual cognitive IQ test problems, 
often involve multiple correct and multiple incorrect answers.”29  This reality refutes the 
standard that intelligence tests must evaluate answers exclusively in the affirmative (only 
one correct answer). Additionally, and in the particular case of the MEIS and MSCEIT 
tests, sufficient evidence exists to support their discriminant and predictive validity, as 
well as reliability, furthering the notion that emotional intelligence in general, and 
Salovey and Mayer’s model in particular, are viable concepts.30  Specifically, their model 
and its related tests assess skills, not traits as other EI constructs and personality related 
tests do.  Distinguishing skill from trait permits EI, as Mayer and Salovey define and test 
it, to satisfy the three broad criteria of traditional intelligence: (1) evaluation by more-or-
less correct answers, (2) demonstration of specific patterns of correlation to other known 
                                                 
26 Locke, “Why Emotional Intelligence is an Invalid Concept,” 426. 
27 Landy, “Some Historical,” 419. 
28 Conte, “A Review and Critique,” 437. 
29 Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso, “A Further Consideration,” 251.   
30 Daus and Ashkanasy, “The Case for the Ability-Based,” Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso, “Emotional 
Intelligence,” and “A Further Consideration,” and Matthews, Zeidner, and Roberts, Emotional Intelligence, 
175–226. 
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intelligences, and (3) development with age.31  EI proponents understand the embryonic 
nature of emotional intelligence studies, and support, just as opponents do, further 
research and experimentation to test its significance as a component of intelligence.32   
One example of such research indicates that emotions are generated and managed 
by a distinctive neural mechanism that suggests the ability to perceive, develop, and 
enhance decision-making through emotive, not cognitive, dominance.33  Figure 1 depicts 
the two separate pathways—emotive and cognitive—that govern decision-making.  “In a 
by now famous set of experiments performed in the 1980s, Benjamin Libet, a 
physiologist, found that brain signals associated with movement occurred half a second 
before the person was conscious of deciding to move.”34 
 
Figure 1.  Pathways of Decision Making 
                                                 
31 Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso, “Emotional Intelligence,” 200. 
32 Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso, “A Further Consideration,” 254. 
33 John Elster, Strong Feelings: Emotion, Addiction and Human Behavior (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1999); Janice Gross Stein, “Rational Deterrence against Irrational Adversaries,” in Complex 
Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age, ed. T.V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, and James J. Wirtz, 58–82 
(Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2009); Krueger, et al., “The Neural Bases;” and Goleman, 
The Brain and New Insights. 
34 Stein, “Rational Deterrence,” 68. 
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This phenomenon illustrates the direct “low road” pathway and supports the 
argument that conscious cognition is bypassed prior to action. Elster suggests that 
“emotions and cravings might sometimes be so strong as to short-circuit rational choice, 
or even choice altogether. At their strongest, these urges seem to have an overpowering 
quality that leaves little room for comparison and choice.”35  Indeed, research suggests 
“that emotion precedes choice, emotions trigger choices, and emotion follows in the wake 
of choice to shape what people learn from their choices.”36  Elster eloquently describes 
the power of emotion and its consequences as follows: 
Emotions matter because they move and disturb us, and because, through their 
links with social norms, they stabilize social life. They also interfere with our 
thought processes, making them less rational than they would otherwise be. In 
particular, they induce unrealistic expectations about what we can do and achieve, 
and unrealistic beliefs about other people’s opinions about ourselves. . .. When we 
are under the sway of strong emotions, we easily indulge in wishful thinking, such 
as the belief that all good things go together and that there is no need to make 
hard choices. The belief that one can have the motivating power of emotions 
without their distorting power is itself an instance of the same fallacy. Emotions 
provide a meaning and sense of direction to life, but they also prevent us from 
going steadily in that direction.37 
The power of emotions and their influence over decision-making and action are at the 
heart of emotional intelligence.38  Mayer and Salovey’s four branches address the critical 
need to perceive, assimilate, and ultimately govern emotions, thus leaving us masters of 
our own fate rather than subjects of passion’s folly.  Or as Hamlet aptly puts it: “Give me 
that man / That is not passion’s slave.”39 
Perception of emotion is at the forefront of the sequential maturation of EI. 
Perception is based on awareness, which is a cognitive skill that undergoes a 
development similar to cognition in general. Lane and Schwartz proposed a model that 
                                                 
35 Elster, Strong Feelings, 12. 
36 Stein, “Rational Deterrence,” 68. 
37 Elster, Nuts and Bolts, 69–70. 
38 James J. Gross and Oliver P. John, “Wise Emotion Regulation,” in The Wisdom in Feeling: 
Psychological Processes in Emotional Intelligence, eds. Lisa Feldman Barrett and Peter Salovey (New 
York, NY: The Guilford Press, 2002), 297–318. 
39 William Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act 3, Scene 2.  http://shakespeare-navigators.com/hamlet/H32.html. 
 17 
depicts five levels of graduated emotional awareness, requiring an individual to master 
the previous level before advancing to the next. The five levels, in ascending order, are: 
(1) awareness of physical sensations, (2) action tendencies, (3) single emotions, (4) 
blends of emotions, and (5) blends of blends of emotional experience (or the capacity to 
appreciate complexity in the experiences of self and others).40  Cognitive maturation 
encourages but does not guarantee emotional awareness. Although the capacity may 
exist, perceiving emotion is only possible through intentional learning and reflection, and 
is often connected with the nurturing role parents play in the life of a child. Since 
emotional awareness requires training to develop, and is connected to neurological 
development, it stands to reason that specific areas of the brain are responsible for 
governing emotions, and that growth in these areas signals the separation between 
emotional and cognitive intelligence. To that end, recent advances in technology provide 
scientists the ability to associate specific brain areas with unique mental functions.   
Like cartographers meticulously mapping serpentine coastlines, neuropsychologists 
are now able to draw pathways between sub-regions of the prefrontal cortex (PFC), the 
brain’s executive center, and an individual’s ability to solve personal and interpersonal 
problems, manage impulses, express feelings effectively, and relate well to others.41  
Additional components of the brain, such as the anterior cingulate, right amygdala, 
insular cortex, and subcortex are directly related to one’s self-awareness, and one’s 
ability to express empathy, and process distressing and strong emotions. These regions of 
the brain are distinctive from the neocortex, which manages cognitive operations (verbal, 
mathematical, and spatial IQs). Being able to identify different areas of the brain 
responsible for cognition and emotional management lends credibility to those who 
support EI as a separate intelligence. However, it is still critical to address whether these 
disparate regions operate in parallel or in series. Are they interfacing and mutually 
reliant, which would support a more collective and comprehensive view of intelligence?  
Or do they rely upon one another, resulting in diminished capability if a subcomponent is 
                                                 
40 Barrett and Salovey, The Wisdom in Feeling, 273. 
41 Goleman, The Brain and New Insights. 
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impaired or low functioning?  Fortunately, a study published in late 2009 offers evidence 
to support the notion that these distinct intelligences operate in parallel, not as a series. 
The study tested damaged brain regions in combat veterans from the Vietnam 
War who suffered focal penetrating head injuries. Specifically, the functions of the 
ventromedial PFC (vmPFC) and dorsolateral PFC (dlPFC) were analyzed, areas which 
were hypothesized to mediate the perception and management of emotions. The study 
examined two key competencies of emotional intelligence: 1) strategic EI—which is the 
competency to understand emotional information and apply it for the management of the 
self and others, and 2) experiential EI—which is the competency to perceive emotional 
information and apply it for integration into thinking. Patients were given the MSCEIT as 
well as standard neuropsychological tests to assess their EI competencies, cognitive 
functioning, and intelligence. A control group of patients without head injuries was also 
assessed; the groups were matched with respect to age, level of education, and pre-injury 
general intelligence.   
The results indicate that those with vmPFC injuries suffered decreased capacity, 
resulting in “social incompetence, diminished sensitivity to socially relevant stimuli and 
situational nuances, problems in interpersonal interactions, and abnormal changes in 
mood and personality.”42  Likewise, those suffering from dlPFC injuries demonstrated 
sub-optimal levels of thinking and judgment, which is indicative of the PFC’s role in 
incorporating emotional information into the orchestration of thought, intention, and 
action. Ultimately, this study “broadens our understanding on how EI is mediated by the 
social brain and demonstrates that it can be dissociated from cognitive intelligence.”43  
However, while compelling, the analysis fails to answer a critical question: can EI-related 
skills be learned, or relearned, increasing one’s ability to self-regulate and associate with 
others?  The following historical vignette provides evidence to support these possibilities.   
Phineas Gage was a railroad foreman during the 1840s in Vermont. Known to be 
a “great favorite” of the men in his charge and regarded as “the most efficient and 
                                                 
42 Krueger, et al., “The Neural Bases,” 22488. 
43 Ibid., 22489. 
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capable foreman” by his employers, his disposition and reputation abruptly changed after 
a particularly gruesome accident sustained on the afternoon of September 13, 1848.44  
While preparing the bedrock with his tamping iron, Phineas accidentally detonated the 
explosives. The force of the blast rifled the tamping iron into his left jaw, through his 
prefrontal cortex, and out the top of his skull. Miraculously, he recovered from the 
traumatic injury, but not without sustaining significant impairment of his emotional 
competencies.   
He was still able to read and speak, and he performed well above average on 
cognitive ability tests. However, it became clear he had lost his ability to 
experience emotion; he was emotionless at even the saddest misfortunes or the 
happiest occasions.45   
He began making irrational decisions, and moved from job to job until eventually gaining 
employment with a circus.   
Surprisingly, Phineas began to re-associate more effectively with members of 
society some years after his injury, gaining employment in Chile and traveling widely in 
association with his near celebrity status. Numerous 21st century doctors, after examining 
medical records and eye-witness accounts, and recreating Mr. Gage’s injuries, 
hypothesize that this adjustment represents an authentic social recovery. In particular, Dr. 
Malcolm Macmillan suggests that “someone or something gave enough structure to their 
lives [speaking collectively about individuals with similar traumatic brain injuries] for 
them to relearn lost social and personal skills.”46  Successful habilitation, at least in the 
case of Mr. Phineas Gage, seems to indicate that lost emotional competencies can be 
restored through training and adaptive behaviors. Likewise, his recovery supports the  
 
 
                                                 
44 Stephen P. Robbins & Timothy A. Judge, Essentials of Organizational Behavior, 11th ed. (Upper 
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2012), 38. 
45 Robbins and Judge, Essentials of Organizational Behavior, 38. 
46 Malcolm Macmillan, “Phineas Gage—Unravelling the Myth,” The Psychologist 21, no. 9 
(September 2008): 828–831, 831, 
http://www.thepsychologist.org.uk/archive/archive_home.cfm?volumeID=21&editionID=164&ArticleID=
1399 (accessed February 22, 2013). 
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current science that neurogenesis (discussed below) aids in the development of new skills 
and abilities, thereby providing individuals the opportunity and ability to learn critical 
emotional competencies. 
In addition to suggesting that EI belongs in a separate category from cognitive 
intelligence, this vignette also supports the idea that individuals can increase their level of 
emotional intelligence through learning. Before discussing two studies that further 
support EI’s learnability, it is important to briefly describe the science behind the miracle 
of learning.  
Neurogenesis is the process that generates 10,000 new brain cells every day.47 
Half of all newly created brain cells migrate to critical need areas in the brain, aiding 
existing brain cells by assuming their same role. Destinations within the brain may differ, 
but science is showing that it is areas of learning that often receive these new cells. The 
continual reshaping of the brain, based on experiences, intentions, and desires, is called 
neuroplasticity, which explains how circuitry develops to master new tasks.48  In 
laymen’s terms, this is the process of developing new habits or overcoming old ones. 
What is most difficult about this is that it takes time and intentionality to either develop 
new circuits to manage developing skills, or abandon old circuits that no longer serve an 
individual’s needs. 
Recognizing the requirement for time and intentionality, two separate groups of 
scientists conducted a series of experiments in 2008 and 2009 with participants who 
suffered from either traumatic or acute brain injuries. Participants suffered from a 
diminished ability to interpret emotion in others, chronic social difficulties or isolation, 
apparent disregard or a lack of awareness of social cues, or inappropriate social 
responding—all abilities directly related to EI. The experiments implemented a range of 
training methodologies, which included self-instruction training, errorless learning, facial 
                                                 
47 Goleman, The Brain and New Insights. 
48 Ibid. 
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affect recognition, and stories of emotional inference.49  After the training, participants 
demonstrated an increased ability to perceive emotions in others and to relate more 
effectively in their natural surroundings, suggesting that training can improve emotion 
perception, a fundamental aspect of EI. In response to one of the experiment’s outcomes, 
Dr. Bornhofen noted that “the results are cause for optimism that people suffering 
traumatic brain injuries can be retrained to identify emotions in others, and to begin 
functioning normally again.”50  Whether impairment or low functioning is a result of 
injury or poor development, these studies, and the science of neuropsychology, support 
the notion that competencies associated with emotional intelligence are trainable, 
resulting in an increased ability to relate effectively with others. Understanding and 
effectively associating with one’s operational environment is an especially critical skill 
for Special Forces operators charged with thickening the Global SOF Network, as the 
following indicates.   
During a recent video teleconference in February 2013 with Naval Postgraduate 
students, Major General (MG) Michael K. Nagata, the Deputy Director of Special 
Operation, suggested that the traditional approach to winning arguments through reason 
alone was ineffective at best when it comes to securing favorable decisions from JIIM 
partners in the National Capital Region and around the globe.51 As a veteran Special 
Forces operator, MG Nagata epitomizes the forward thinking, people-focused 
professional who is well equipped to “build rapport” and navigate the human domain. He 
likened the JIIM environment to a psychological battlefield, rife with nuanced 
personalities, divergent cultures, and an uncommon language. In place of reason alone, 
which typically pervades DoD decision-making, he argued that emotional connectedness 
through shared perceptions tends to bridge the cultural and professional JIIM gaps. 
                                                 
49 Dawn Radice-Neumann, Barbra Zupan, Machiko Tomita, and Barry Willer, “Training Emotional 
Processing in Persons with Brain Injury,” The Journal of Head Trauma Rehabilitation 24, no. 5 (2009): 
313–323, and Cristina Bornhofen and Skye McDonald, “Comparing Strategies for Treating Emotion 
Perception Deficits in Traumatic Brain Injury,” The Journal of Head Trauma Rehabilitation 23, no. 2 
(2008): 103–115. 
50 News Staff, “Learning Emotions After A Brain Injury,” Science 2.0 Blog, entry posted November 
20, 2008, http://www.science20.com/news_releases/learning_emotions_again_after_brain_injury (accessed 
March 17, 2013). 
51 Michael K. Nagata, Group Video Teleconference, February 26, 2013. 
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Although MG Nagata’s observation points to the importance of EI, it also reflects 
recognition of the need to achieve synthesis and balance of emotion and cognition. Or as 
Silvan Tomkins notes, “out of the marriage of reason with affect there issues clarity with 
passion. Reason without affect would be impotent, affect with reason would be blind.”52   
Given most Americans’ bias toward cognitive abilities, the addition of emotion 
into the cognitive mix represents a fervent call to arms to acknowledge and pursue 
competencies such as perception and management of emotions in self and others. For a 
SOF operator, the challenge to understand one’s operational environment begins with 
knowing oneself.  Reportedly etched into the wall of the oracle’s temple in Delphi, the 
maxim to know thyself is now written upon the hearts and minds of every SOF operator.  
Where the real challenge lies is in developing a personal and professional culture that 
prioritizes introspection and analysis.  To know oneself is a task worth mastering by 
every resilient operator faced with thickening the Global SOF Network.   
D. THE RESILIENT OPERATOR: CORNERSTONE OF MISSION 
PERFORMANCE 
The Special Forces Regiment has sustained unparalleled levels of high operational 
tempo since 2001, requiring more from its warriors and professionals than has ever been 
asked before. Recognizing the pressure and strain on the force, USSOCOM is 
aggressively implementing programs, such as the Tactical Human Optimization Rapid 
Rehabilitation Reconditioning (THOR3) Program, to maximize the performance and 
resiliency of its operators. Admiral McRaven, in his posture statement to the Senate 
Armed Services Committee on March 5, 2013, noted that “through human performance 
improvement, readiness, and spiritual growth, we hope to preserve our forces for the 
duration of their careers.”53  This relatively vague statement could be taken to refer to 
numerous developed and developing programs, educational initiatives, and organizational 
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(accessed September 10, 2013). 
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2013): 10, http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2013_hr/030513mcraven.pdf (accessed May 14, 2013). 
 23 
shifts designed to address the complex demands of the security environment of tomorrow 
and beyond. Consequently, as has been noted, this environment will increasingly require 
a synchronized response built from well-developed JIIM relationships. As the SOF 
network grows, placing Special Forces operators into new organizations and cultures, the 
link between building effective relationships and mission performance becomes all the 
more important. This current and future reality should inspire the Regiment to turn its 
attention to the important and fundamental function of EI, and the need to develop 
relevant and realistic training to enhance individual and collective relationship-building 
capabilities. 
Although having high emotional intelligence equips an individual to master the 
ability to effectively relate well to others, it is not the only variable required to build 
lasting, self-sacrificing partnerships. Skills and abilities related to EI must be coupled 
with a genuine care and respect for potential partners, based not on serving self, as are 
many U.S.-dominated defense relationships. By serving the respective security interests 
of JIIM partners, Special Forces operators stand the best chance to develop authentic 
friendships that inevitably produce willingness in partners to participate in collective 
initiatives. Humility is an additional quality that, like tenderness, is seldom discussed 
within our ranks. In addition to genuine care, it is a critical characteristic required to 
climb the “4 Cs” ladder to partnership. Synchronizing and sustaining the Global SOF 
Network requires Communication, Coordination, Collaboration, and Consolidation. As 
operators and units ascend this hierarchy, the likelihood of a DoD lead in any initiative 
should decrease, but that requires a full measure of humility on the part of SOF operators 
to maintain and enhance relationships. Thus, while the skills associated with EI are 
necessary to build better relationships, only when they are paired with genuine care and 
humility does the combination become truly potent. 
Enhanced relationships ensure increased mission performance, but are not 
necessarily sufficient to ensure mission success. It would be foolish to suggest that 
developing higher levels of EI throughout the Special Forces community would lead to 
guaranteed mission success.  Just as current EI academics implore future researchers to 
develop models that integrate cognitive intelligence, EI, and the BFF, recognizing their 
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parallel and iterative effect on one another, so too must we acknowledge the other 
variables required to successfully accomplish mission objectives.54  Tangibles such as 
tactical and technical capability, and available resources, combined with intangibles such 
as leadership, unit cohesion, and morale, fill in the gaps between improved mission 
performance and mission success. The variable of leadership in particular tends to merge 
discrete and collective characteristics, suggesting a truly holistic phenomenon that 
enables mission success. Considering the strong connection between the skills and 
abilities of EI and leadership, exemplified by the proliferation of countless self-help 
volumes devoted to this topic, it is important to comment on why this thesis will focus on 
EI and not leadership. 
E. LEADERLESS FRIENDSHIPS: WHY LEADERSHIP IS NEITHER 
NECESSARY NOR SUFFICIENT 
As this thesis is germane to the DoD, specifically to the Special Forces Regiment, 
it is essential to point out that the Army is currently conducting research on emotional 
management and its impact on leadership. Emotional management, the fourth branch of 
the Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso construct, represents the most complex segment of 
emotional intelligence. Army-sponsored researchers conceived a theoretical model of 
emotional management that highlights six components of leader knowledge, behaviors, 
and competencies.55  Although this model describes how to incorporate emotions into a 
more comprehensive model of leadership, it does not discretely apply to developing 
relationships with individuals from different cultures (JIIM). The gap, therefore, warrants 
continued exploration for the role EI may play in assisting the SF Regiment to develop 
the long, loyal, and self-sacrificing foreign partnerships required to address our nation’s 
needs throughout the 21st century. 
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As the Army begins officially to incorporate emotions into a management model 
for leaders, it is important to distinguish why leadership, though critical in its own regard, 
is not necessary or sufficient to build effective and reliable relationships. Countless 
examples exist of leaderless friendships, such as the bonds shared among siblings, the 
nurturing relationship of husband and wife, the inter-dependability experienced on 
professional and amateur athletic teams, or the camaraderie of two Soldiers sharing a 
lonely foxhole. Although a transformational leader who demonstrates high levels of EI 
may help facilitate the accomplishment of common goals or pursuits, his or her presence 
is unnecessary to maintain or enhance the collective trust and respect that represents the 
core of these or other kinds of friendship.56  The essence of a relationship instead stems 
from an individual’s ability to speak to the heart of another. Heart issues are emotion 
laden; to navigate them adeptly requires a synthesis of cognitive and emotional 
intelligence. When paired with mutual respect expressed through empathy, the synthesis 
results in the establishment, maintenance, and enhancement of reliable friendships. As 
will be described in the next chapter, the OSS Assessment Staff also recognized that 
leadership was not the most essential quality required to knit together the partisan 
networks of World War II. 
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IV. ASSESSING EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE OFFICE 
OF STRATEGIC SERVICES 
What we call wisdom is the result of all the wisdom of past ages. Our best 
institutions are like young trees growing upon the roots of the old trunks that have 
crumbled away.57 
A. REDISCOVERING OUR ROOTS 
People have a tendency to idealize the past while lamenting the present, or remain 
hopeful in the newness of the present while ignoring the lessons of the past. The reality, 
however, is firmly established in the balance of both: recognizing the wisdom of the past 
and applying it to benefit the circumstances of the present. As the tide of war in 
Afghanistan ebbs, and as the special operations community shifts its focus toward 
building a global network of willing and capable partners to protect U.S. national 
interests, an intentional period of reflection and projection is necessary to fuse the lessons 
learned in the past to the challenges of the present and future. Maintaining an unbroken 
organizational narrative through the disciplined adherence to the five SOF truths will 
dispel the likelihood of succumbing to community-wide amnesia during this time of 
transition:  
 
Indicative of SOF’s orientation, each truth centers on the community’s greatest 
asset—its people. And although the Special Forces’ mission has morphed over the last 61 
years, its focus and priority on people has not. Tracing the Special Forces’ lineage to the 
OSS connects the branch to the primary root, anchoring any careful analysis of the 
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SOF Truths 
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present in the firm ground of the past. Although our imaginations are often captured by 
the novelty of the present, one can easily recognize the wisdom in the writer of 
Ecclesiastes’ observation that “what has been will be again; there is nothing new under 
the sun.”58  In the special operations realm, although missions and priorities change, the 
fundamental composition of the units tasked to execute them remains the same; the men 
and women of SOF form the essential building blocks of U.S. national policy in action.  
Well assessed, selected, assigned, trained and equipped, they serve, as Aaron Banks 
described them, as “the best ambassadors we have” to a shrinking world in conflict.59  
But what sort of men and women were capable of winning the shadow wars of World 
War II, and are the individuals required today to prevent, shape, and win cut from the 
same cloth? 
The mark of the quiet professional, whether today’s Green Beret or yesteryear’s 
OSS operative, is easily recognizable, difficult to describe, and nearly impossible to 
define. However, recognizing that no one single quality is necessary or sufficient on its 
own to meet demanding special operations requirements, there is a particular competency 
central to them all. Referred to as “that added dimension,”60 model special operations 
personnel maintain high quotients of EI, equipping them with the skills and abilities 
necessary to maintain themselves and the critical relationships with other partners 
essential to accomplishing their mission.  Although EI is a relatively new concept, the 
OSS assessment staff recognized its major components more than fifty years before its 
scientific emergence and validation. Retracing the OSS assessment staff’s thoughts, 
analyses, and conclusions, as well as reviewing their assessment methodology, will 
illuminate EI’s significance and serve to further our collective understanding of the 
concept, and ultimately the need for its continued development and inclusion in the 
Special Forces community today. 
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In many ways, the major takeaway from the science supporting EI is the 
importance of the collective whole. Because EI serves as a measure of one’s ability to 
“persist in the face of frustrations; to control impulse and delay gratification; to regulate 
one’s mood and keep distress from swamping the ability to think; to empathize and to 
hope,” it can buttress cognitive intelligence, but should still be considered separate.61  
These indispensable abilities are evaluable, as the OSS assessment team and today’s three 
primary emotional intelligence constructs demonstrate, and the skills are trainable, as 
neuropsychology suggests. What remains is to determine whether the OSS developed 
suitable situational environments in which to evaluate candidates’ EI, and whether 
selected personnel received the kind of training that further enhanced their EI quotients. 
B. OSS ASSESSMENT: IDENTIFYING THE “RIGHT STUFF” 
Forged in the fires of World War II, the OSS (originally the Coordinator of 
Information) provided the United States with an organization authorized and capable of 
“collect[ing] and analyz[ing] all information and data, which may bear upon national 
security . . . and to carry out, when requested by the President, such supplementary 
activities as may facilitate the securing of information important for national security.”62  
William Donovan, the organization’s first director, envisioned a war plan detailing “a 
soften-up process to pave the way for the regular armed forces, consisting broadly of 
three phases: first, secret intelligence infiltration and preparation; second, sabotage and 
subversive harassing tactics; and third, resistance groups and guerrilla or commando 
operations.”63  Critically necessary to each of these three phases was the assessment and 
selection of the right personnel, and their assignment to the right mission(s). 
Interestingly, Donovan’s OSS became an integrative organization capable of far reaching 
and strategic effects—a capability other nations preferred to isolate in separate 
agencies.64  
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From the beginning, well before the creation of Station S (OSS’s primary 
assessment facility), the OSS recruited heavily from Ivy League schools, law firms, and 
major corporations for their talent. It sought individuals with an “unfettered sense of 
curiosity,”65 optimists and idealists warmed by the courage and heroism of marginalized 
people suffering under tyrannical rule,66 and poets—though some may argue that 
pretenders would be a more accurate name—who were capable of developing cover 
stories through “hidden networks of voices, identities, codes, and operations.”67 The OSS 
recruited a broad variety of men and women characterized by out of the box thinking 
distinguished by boldness and decisiveness,68 as well as individuals possessing superior 
mental and psychological standards of uncommon stability, judgment, and independent 
thinking.69  These individuals were also free from disturbing prejudices70 and were 
perceptive, persuasive, and assertive when necessary, as well as diplomatic.71   
All of these qualities mirror those inherent in the concept and constructs of 
emotional intelligence, and collectively—with adequate cognitive and physical 
competencies—represent the quintessential “whole of man” personality. Ultimately, the 
man or woman OSS sought “was a secure, capable, intelligent and creative person who 
could deal effectively with uncertainty and considerable stress.”72  As Donovan offered, 
“I’d rather have a young lieutenant with guts enough to disobey an order than a colonel 
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too regimented to think and act for himself.”73  These attributes encouraged a certain 
disposition toward personal humility and equality among the ranks, encouraging officers 
and enlisted personnel to relate more as peers.74   
Indeed, the following excerpt is from a letter received by the OSS assessment 
staff communicating the importance of selecting individuals with higher and more 
complementary cognitive and emotion quotients: 
The organization has been recruiting too many men who have intelligence and the 
necessary mechanical training but who lack common sense, know nothing about 
working with men or how to look after the welfare and the morale of the men 
under them. We simply must have men who can shoulder responsibility and use 
initiative with common sense. Simply because a man has intelligence does not 
qualify him for this type of work. In some instances we also have had men who 
fall into the class of high-strung or emotional type. We simply cannot use men of 
that type in the field when they have to live with Chinese, eat Chinese food, and 
be under pressure at times. In most cases these men have suffered nervous 
breakdowns and other nervous ailments.75 
It is clear from this letter, that members of the assessment staff believed that effective 
action proceeds from an adequate composite intelligence. Recruits had to possess 
sufficient cognitive and emotive capabilities to survive and flourish on the battlefield. 
Reflecting on the necessary traits and abilities of Jedburgh recruits, Will Irwin likewise 
notes that “mental stamina was no less important than physical endurance; and maturity, 
emotional stability, and self-discipline would be needed for the men to hold up under 
stressful situations or during periods of prolonged isolation.”76 
Meanwhile, some skills are easier to evaluate than others, complicating the design 
and implementation of any assessment program. Provided with only general guidance 
from Donovan, and in light of the gravity of World War II, the OSS assessment staff 
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understood that the task set before them required a new methodology, one that had never 
been attempted before in the United States.77  What they ended up developing was a 
multiform organismic system of assessment.  “Multiform because it consists of a rather 
large number of procedures based on different principles, and organismic (or Gestalt, or 
holistic) because it utilized the data obtained through these procedures for attempting to 
arrive at a picture of personality as a whole.”78 “Personality as a whole” refers to clusters 
of general qualifications (attributes, traits, skills, etc.). Although, in theory, assessing 
personality sounds relatively simple, the inconsistent nature of man makes it very 
difficult. The OSS assessment staff agreed with the notion that “universal human 
experience teaches us that it is emotional, intellectual, and conative energy directed 
toward a defined purpose which organizes the psychological processes into a temporal 
whole.”79  They thus forged ahead in an experimental fashion, designing situational 
environments capable of inducing a broad spectrum of behaviors.  
Incidentally, despite the difficulty of developing a new evaluation methodology, 
the OSS assessment staff also faced numerous other obstacles, three of which were 
unique to the design and implementation phase. First, they were tasked to assess a wide 
variety of jobs, which meant they had prospective financial officers, instructors and 
leaders of guerrilla units, and propaganda script writers and actors all together in a single 
assessment class, without knowing who was destined for which unit or mission.80  This 
forced staff members to evaluate broader characteristics, rather than being able to assess a 
particular candidate against a narrower set of needed qualities. Second, they lacked 
accurate descriptions of potential jobs, since the few agents and operators who were 
already operational—those who were employed by the OSS prior to the assessment 
program launching in January 1944—lacked sufficient experience to be authoritative 
when describing their roles or what was required to succeed in their operational 
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environments.81  And third, the staff found itself unable to create standardized tests to 
evaluate special skills, such as those required for policy-making, calculating enemy 
vulnerabilities, practicing tropical medicine, running a linotype machine, or drawing 
Japanese propaganda posters.82  These special aptitudes were left to candidates’ branch 
administrative officers to evaluate based on a subjective review of a candidate’s job 
history and self-reporting. 
Despite these impediments, the assessment staff concluded that the “success or 
failure of a stressful secret mission would probably depend in large part on the 
candidate’s ability to cooperate and get along with others and to lead others in a 
harmonious and productive manner.”83  Staff members postulated the critical importance 
of seven distinct variables, three of which lie at the heart of EI and appear in italics: 
motivation for assignment, energy and initiative, effective intelligence, emotional 
stability, social relations, leadership, and security.84  While still recognizing the need for 
cognitive capability, the assessment staff focused primarily on psychological factors of 
personality and on one variable in particular: emotional stability.85  Staff members 
concluded that “from first to last, the problem of emotional stability was a central issue in 
assessment, a vastly important consideration in predicting a candidate’s overall 
effectiveness in the field. It was the variable of personality most subject to change, and if 
changed for the worse, it could vitiate all the other skills of a candidate.”86   
The OSS’s recognition of the critical role emotions play in one’s overall ability to 
relate effectively to one’s environment serves as a reminder that what is most important is 
often unseen and unexpressed, and, therefore, problematic to evaluate. As one OSS 
assessment staff member put it, “for many jobs, personality factors are quite as important 
as is mental keenness or trade skills. But bravery, calmness under heckling, ability to 
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control temper, facility in persuading a group to take some action, are much more 
difficult to assess.”87  Ultimately, the OSS staff faced the problem of being able to 
predict human behavior in novel and complex environments, and chose to rely on 
analyzing those variables it considered most indicative of the whole.   
C. ASSESSING EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE OSS 
As mentioned previously, the OSS assessment staff employed a multiform 
organismic methodology to effectively evaluate personality as a whole. Inherent to this 
methodology is the fundamental fact that behavior of the highest order depends on two 
distinct abilities: “(1) the individual’s ability to perceive and interpret properly the whole 
situation that confronts them [sic] and (2) his ability to coordinate his acts and direct 
them in proper sequence toward the proper objects.”88  If one compares this to Mayer and 
Salovey’s construct, the two necessary abilities of the organismic methodology mirror all 
four branches of the EI model: 1) perception of emotion, 2) integration and assimilation 
of emotion, 3) knowledge about emotions, and 4) management of emotions. Specifically, 
the ability to perceive and integrate emotions into thought and action, coupled with 
knowledge of the emotions and their impacts, is critical to knowing one’s operational 
environment. Likewise, effective management of emotions encourages proper sequencing 
and orientation. 
On reflection, the OSS staff acknowledged that trained experts—psychologists 
and psychiatrists, not technical/mechanical instruments—were necessary, because 
elementalistic tests, such as IQ, were simply insufficient.89  Staff members further 
recognized the “necessity of relating all observations to each other, not in a mechanical 
way, but by an interpretive process aiming at the discovery of general patterns and action 
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systems.”90  In this way, the OSS staff argued that the organismic methodology 
accomplished everything the elementalistic approach did, but it added the benefit of 
supplementary procedures and the tentative interpretation of results, thereby more fully 
articulating a predictive representation of personality as a whole.91  Cleverly, the staff 
opted to administer the elementalistic tests—a personal history form, two intelligence 
tests, a sentence completion test, and a work conditions questionnaire—assessing the 
more overt layers of personality first, and reserving the supplemental tests designed to tap 
the deeper dispositions until the candidate’s general defenses were lowered.92 
For instance, the staff used the sentence completion and projective questionnaire 
to incrementally encourage candidates to descend deeper into their own personality. The 
sentence completion test included benign topics such as family history and preferred 
hobbies and activities, but it also addressed topics such as “inner states: the subject’s 
feelings and attitudes toward himself; . . . reaction to frustration and failure; . . . 
optimism-pessimism: expectations of success and failure; . . . and reaction of others: 
what, according to the subject, his friends think of him.”93  In so doing, the sentence 
completion test, which was interpreted, not scored, provided unique insight into the 
candidate’s emotional intelligence. Similarly, the projective questionnaire shed light on 
the “candidate’s emotional life, something of his most impressive experiences, something 
of his attitudes and sentiments.”94  Each question was carefully chosen based on 
scientific theory, and answers were again interpreted, not scored, as were those of other 
elementalistic tests. Some of the most telling responses included “such frank answers as, 
‘Loneliness for parents,’ ‘Thinking perhaps there’s something I have missed in life or 
failed to do,’ ‘Feeling sorry for myself,’ or ‘Having someone dislike me.’”95  Because the 
subjective and interpretive organismic methodology requires candidates to respond as 
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genuinely as possible, these preliminary tests placed candidates in a more reflective and 
natural state, which decreased their guardedness, and resulted in most expressing their 
authentic selves during the remaining situational tests. Convinced that students were 
sufficiently authentic, the OSS assessment staff proceeded with administering a battery of 
tests created to specifically test one or more of the seven principle variables. 
1. Emotional Stability 
At the time, the OSS assessment staff defined emotional stability as the “ability to 
govern disturbing emotions, steadiness and endurance under pressure, snafu tolerance, 
freedom from neurotic tendencies.”96  Unlike proponents of emotional intelligence today, 
who take into account the management and regulation of both positive and negative 
emotions, the OSS staff conceived of emotional stability as individuals’ ability to govern 
only negative emotions. Specifically, the staff viewed emotional stability through two 
lenses: “(1) Do undesirable emotions occur frequently and intensely?  (2) If such 
emotions do occur, can they be held in check or canalized in desirable directions?”97  
Although numerous tests provided opportunities to evaluate a candidate’s emotional 
stability, three in particular generated the most observable traits. 
The Construction Test was designed specifically “to test the reactions of the 
candidate to ‘snafu,’ to belittling and insulting remarks, and in addition to provide some 
indication of his ability to manage recalcitrant, irritating, and stupid subordinates.”98  The 
test replicated a construction site and assigned the candidate to be the lead foreman and 
manager of two workers. The candidate was not able to directly assist in the construction 
project, but was encouraged to provide instruction to the two laborers.  “This innocent-
looking task was made positively impossible because the ‘helpers’ were actually staff 
members (stooges) dressed as candidates, whose job it was to frustrate the completion of 
the building by various destructive and passive-aggressive maneuvers.”99  One 
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recognizes the true intent and power of the test given the fact that no candidate was ever 
able to get the two stooges to properly assemble the structure. Under these circumstances, 
the best solution from the staff’s perspective was for the candidate to attempt to explain 
what he wished to accomplish, to delegate specific responsibilities, and to closely 
monitor the stooges’ progress (or lack thereof), all while attempting to genuinely care for 
and respect them as equals and essential team members.100  The interpersonal skills and 
abilities hit the EI constructs’ principle tenet: one has to understand and control the 
internal before they can recognize and effectively manage the external. 
The second test the OSS assessors used to evaluate emotional stability was the 
Stress Interview. Candidates were informed that they had twelve minutes to develop a 
cover story to explain why they were caught looking through files marked SECRET in a 
government building in Washington. At the end of the twelve minutes they were escorted 
into the basement of Station S and ushered into a darkened room with one solitary bright 
light. The interviewer began with some basic pleasantries and then quickly got more 
intense and personal. The rapidity of the interrogator’s questions, accusations, and 
interruptions increased throughout, placing the candidate in a defensive position and 
alarmed state. Every effort was made to increase the stress of the situation, from requiring 
the candidate to sit upright and unfold his or her legs if they were crossed, to using 
information from the Sentence Completion Test and Projective Questionnaire to 
personalize the questions. Indications of deficient emotional stability were noted, such as 
sitting rigidly in the chair, moving restlessly, smoking nervously, stuttering, sweating, 
exploding in anger, or crying. Positive indicators of good emotional stability, meanwhile, 
included a poised and calm demeanor, little reaction to shouting (or an insistence that it 
was unnecessary), attempts to control the interrogation, and even laughing and joking.101  
Candidates capable of maintaining poise in the face of stress clearly displayed self-
regulation and management, in accord with Mayer and Salovey’s fourth branch of EI. 
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The final source of emotional stability came from the casual and constant 
observation of candidates in non-test situations. One unique aspect of the OSS process 
was that the staff and students lived together. This non-threatening environment created 
unparalleled access to candidates’ natural tendencies. The fact that the students had to 
create cover stories and assume alternative identities, as well as wear insignia-free 
uniforms throughout the assessment, enabled each candidate to essentially establish his or 
her own social role based on the anonymity within the community. Often, these roles 
were reflective of candidates’ true personalities, which their real-world roles may have 
masked. Most illuminating were staff observations of candidates’ tolerant and forbearing 
natures.102  These two traits—tolerance and forbearance, often associated with patience 
and empathy—reflect high measures of EI and maturity. 
2. Social Relations 
Although staff members encountered only a few minor difficulties while 
evaluating emotional stability, they faced two serious dilemmas when it came to the 
question of social relations. As defined by the assessment staff, “social relations” refer to 
the “ability to get along well with other people, good will, team play, tact, freedom from 
disturbing prejudices, freedom from annoying traits.”103  Despite the international make-
up of prospective units to which candidates would be sent, the staff was unable to create 
cross-culturally nuanced experimental tests.104 Second, the three-day long assessment 
made it impossible for the staff to estimate how a candidate might fare over time. As the 
staff noted, “Some people are appealing on first acquaintance and can maintain for three 
or more days, if necessary, an agreeable social ‘front,’ but, as time goes on, their 
annoying characteristics emerge.”105  Side-stepping the issue of time as they tried to 
evaluate the presence or absence of the twenty-some traits associated with prosocial 
relations, staff members opted to consider the probable effect a candidate might have on 
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the morale of his assigned unit. One question governed their assessment: “Is he the kind 
of man whom others will want as a member of their group?”106 
As with emotional stability, the staff created a number of tests to specifically 
evaluate social relations ability, and of special note are subsequent studies that examined 
the staff’s effectiveness at determining social relations. The first study compared the 
staff’s evaluations with field commander and branch chief recommendations for selection 
and assignment to operational units. On a scale from 0 to 5, 0 corresponding with low 
social relations ability and 5 relating to high social relations ability, the staff predicted 
with almost 100% accuracy those to whom they gave ratings of 4 and 5. Likewise, those 
the staff gave ratings of 0s and 1s were almost never recommended for service by 
commanders and branch chiefs. As is to be expected, those rated as 2s and 3s received 
mixed recommendations for service.107 
The second study, conducted in the aftermath of World War II, foreshadows 
research being done today on how one’s family life affects emotional intelligence and 
social relations.108  “An analysis of the personality sketches of fifty subjects who had 
received extreme ratings of Social Relations revealed a tendency for high rankings to be 
associated with a happy, affectionate childhood situation, and low scores with an 
unhappy, insecure childhood.”109  What this OSS observation suggests is that family life 
is the first school for emotional learning.  “In this intimate cauldron we learn how to feel 
about ourselves and how others will react to our feelings; how to think about these 
feelings and what choices we have in reacting; how to read and express hopes and 
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fears.”110  In terms of emotional intelligence, the OSS assessment staff unwittingly 
identified the critical significance of the home environment. And although staff members 
could not do anything to change the fundamental effects of upbringing, their intuition 
regarding its significance stands. 
3. Leadership 
Leadership is the third critical competence to be discussed here. Interestingly, 
OSS descriptions of the most effective leaders rarely include traits that overlap with 
emotional stability or social relations. Positive descriptions by OSS staff and students (on 
peer evaluation reports) listed traits such as “self-confidence, common sense, originality, 
assertiveness, cheerfulness, tact, persistence, and a desire to excel.”111  In contrast, 
almost every description of a bad leader included the negative or inverse traits of good 
emotional stability and social relations, such as “readiness for anger, conceit, 
introversion, selfishness, depressive moods, confusion, indecision, excitability, and 
impulsiveness.”112 
The OSS assessment staff defined leadership as “man’s ability to take the 
initiative in social situations, to plan and organize action, and in so doing to evoke 
cooperation.”113  Ironically, emotion is clearly absent in the OSS definition, although it is 
the central component of some of today’s champions of leadership. For instance, 
Goleman, Richard Boyatzis, and Annie McKee suggest that the emotional task of the 
leader is primal. They argue that “throughout history and in cultures everywhere, the 
leader in any human group has been the one to whom others look for assurance and 
clarity when facing uncertainty or threat, or when there’s a job to be done. The leader acts 
as the group’s emotional guide.”114  In reality, it is likely that the OSS staff may have 
been correct in assessing that “the effective leader did not need to be outstanding in these 
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other traits [emotional stability and social relations], but, on the other hand, that he was 
not apt to be strikingly deficient in them.”115  Perhaps this helps explain why the Army’s 
ongoing research, to include studying emotional management in leadership, veers away 
from EI.116  The Army seems to recognize, much as the OSS assessment staff did more 
than seventy years ago, that not all who exude emotional intelligence are great leaders, 
but that all leaders need to maintain an acceptable proficiency in EI.   
Arguably, great leaders are masters of both the cognitive and emotional 
components of leadership. Cognitive abilities, such as having a clarifying vision, 
projecting values, developing strategy, and setting goals, are essential to good leadership. 
But what then separates the proficient from the truly exceptional are the emotional traits, 
which involve “facing the unknown with courage and confidence, inspiring and 
challenging people to do their best, and mobilizing human energy. It’s about channeling 
anxiety into productive action while remaining responsive to the inevitable twists and 
turns that appear unexpectedly.”117 
The OSS assessment staff established that the ability to manage oneself and relate 
to others is critical to being able to accomplish the mission—a mission focused more on 
relationship building and networking than on decisive leadership. The sagacity of this 
decision can be seen in Aaron Banks’s reflections about working with guerrillas. Bank 
noted that “the guerrillas had their own leaders. If we had tried to take over the operation, 
we would have been lucky to get out alive. Our job was to help them plan and keep them 
supplied. But they knew we were there to help them, so they usually did as we 
advised.”118  Friendships, such as those that permitted Banks and countless others to 
advise and assist, were built on trust, which was earned through the intentional pursuit of 
unity through mutual support. Again, trust consists of two primary components: 1) an 
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emotional response based on 2) a performance track record.119  Together, these 
components develop confidence between individuals, within teams, and throughout 
organizations. Meanwhile, one way to develop these components is through training. 
D. FAILURE TO TRAIN EI IN THE OSS 
Once assessed and selected as members of the OSS, operatives entered an 
intensive training program meant to prepare them for the arduous tasks that lay ahead. 
Considering the significance of emotional stability together with the importance of social 
relations and leadership, one would expect OSS training schools to include modules on 
enhancing and utilizing these critical skills. Regrettably, no such comprehensive program 
existed. For example, the 250 hour-long stateside preliminary training for OSS operatives 
assigned to operational groups did not include even one hour on a topic as critical as 
working with indigenous personnel.120 In fact, the only training operatives received that 
loosely related to the enhancement or utilization of emotional intelligence was an 
abbreviated, advanced school on sabotage and guerrilla warfare. Dubbed the Localized 
Social School, “agents were instructed in elementary principles of social control and their 
applicability to control the local population.”121  In after-action reports, operatives 
complained that “there had not been enough instruction in how to organize and work with 
indigenous populations, especially non-European, native populations. Nor was there 
enough training on how to handle resistance groups, particularly those with diverse 
factions and conflicting political agendas.”122 
Despite this lack of training, leaders of the OSS and the British Special 
Operations Executive (SOE) understood the importance of “fit.”  In creating the small 
Jedburgh teams responsible for conducting fifth column activities behind enemy lines in 
France, Holland, and Belgium on or after D-Day, OSS and SOE leaders instructed the 
“Jeds” to “begin seeking out their own teammates—men with whom they felt they could 
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work best in the field. To operate effectively, the men making up a team had to be 
physically, emotionally, and temperamentally compatible—matched like a team of horses 
in harness.”123  Such an implied acceptance of the importance of EI was further reflected 
in the development and execution of a reassessment program for OSS personnel to 
determine their fitness for further assignment.  “Particular emphasis was placed upon the 
possibility of nervous tensions resulting from war experience.”124  For instance, 
operatives suffering from post-traumatic stress disorders or traumatic brain injuries were 
dismissed from duty regardless of their cognitive competencies. This reaffirms EI’s 
prominence in an operator’s ability to accomplish the mission. 
E. EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE: THE FOUNDATION OF SPECIAL 
OPERATIONS EXCELLENCE 
The OSS assessors clearly regarded the emotional component of man as critical. 
Their inventive multiform organismic methodology, coupled with their creative 
formulation of situational tests, established a program capable of effectively evaluating 
the whole man. Despite the physical and technical intensity of the training program, “as a 
postwar report put it, ‘the major goal was psychological—to develop in the student-agent 
an attitude of mind which would respond to an emergency in accordance with the 
exigencies of the particular situation.’”125  By stressing psychological affect from the 
moment of a candidate’s initial assessment through his or her employment, the OSS 
proved able to predict with a high degree of certainty the behavior of its operatives, spies, 
and saboteurs. Equipped with higher than average quotients of EI, most men and women 
in the OSS successfully built and sustained critical partnerships with foreign nationals, 
creating broad networks of influence capable of setting the theaters of World War II 
ablaze. Of particular note, the most effective OSS partnerships were often described as 
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authentic friendships. These friendships were distinguished by displays of patience and 
mutual respect, and the willingness to persevere—all indicators of EI. 126 
Although the OSS’s successes and failures provide countless lessons for the 
special operations community today, perhaps no greater principle exists than this: select 
the right individuals and assign them to the right missions.127  The OSS assessment and 
training staff created a psychologically focused program that served as the essential 
refining fire, capable of separating the dross from the worthwhile specimen. Assessed as 
emotionally stable, cognitively agile, and physically fit, the OSS candidates-turned-
operatives proved the assessment staff’s initial hypothesis to be correct: that a high 
“personality as a whole” score was the trait most necessary and sufficient for mission 
success. Unlike many of their contemporaries, members of the OSS assessment staff 
strayed away from focusing solely on cognitive capabilities, leaning more toward 
emotional competencies as key indicators of “fit.”  Today, as the Special Forces 
community rediscovers its historical roots and looks ahead to the challenges of building a 
Global SOF Network, perhaps it too should lean toward EI as a central predictor of future 
performance. 
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V. 2020: EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE GLOBAL 
SOF NETWORK 
The Human Domain cannot be controlled or managed by technical means or 
capabilities; it requires human contact—person to person interaction—with 
duration and persistence over time that enables commanders to determine who the 
enemy is, where the enemy is and what his likely intentions are.128 
In war, the chief incalculable is the human will.129 
A. REVIEWING THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
In response to the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, the 2011 National Military 
Strategy, the 2010 National Security Strategy, the Capstone Concept for Joint 
Operations: Joint Force 2020, and the Global Trends 2030 report, the United States 
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the United States Army Special 
Operations Command (USASOC) published SOCOM 2020 and ARSOF 2022, 
respectively. These documents address the security paradox facing the United States and 
its allies in the wake of over a dozen years of war, and articulate how SOF, and Army 
SOF in particular, will “provide National Leadership with strategic options for protecting 
and advancing U.S. national interests.”130  Specifically, both documents render a vision 
of what a globally integrated network will look like in 2020 and beyond.131   
Although each outlines increased collaboration built on the social capital of deep 
relationships, tailored responses to regional issues, small forward footprints, and 
expanded authorities, as well as highlighting individual and team capabilities such as 
mastery of interpersonal and social networking skills, language expertise, and expansive 
cultural understanding, neither document explains how these requisite abilities are 
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guaranteed. Nor do their supporting references. In fact, each document assumes that such 
expertise already exists within the ranks. Presumably, if that is the case, then other 
supporting documents such as field manuals or mission essential tasks should provide the 
details about how operators are trained to reach and maintain such proficient levels. To 
confirm these assumptions, it is necessary to first conduct a deliberate review of doctrine 
relevant to the development of the Global SOF Network, the result of which will serve to 
establish what is expected of SOF in general and Army Special Forces personnel in 
particular. Furthermore, and having already established EI as a core competency for 
building partnerships for the Global SOF Network, the balance of this chapter will focus 
on aspects of doctrine that most pertain to EI.   
B. SOCOM 2020: LINKING STRATEGY TO CAPABILITY 
In February 2013, USSOCOM produced a white paper on the Global Special 
Operations Forces Network. It outlined three primary actions essential to establishing and 
managing the network: provide the Geographic Combatant Commanders improved 
special operations capacity, build a global network of SOF, and evolve USSOCOM’s role 
as a Functional Combatant Command with global responsibilities.132  Despite EI’s 
importance in every person-to-person relationship and, therefore, to all three primary 
actions, the second activity—building the Global SOF Network—is particularly pertinent 
to this thesis. Specifically, SOCOM 2020 points out that “success in the future demands 
unprecedented levels of trust, confidence, and understanding—conditions that can’t be 
surged.”133  Furthermore, it notes that “true understanding is only gained through human 
interaction, which requires some form of engagement.”134   
If one takes Adele Lynn’s definition of EI to heart—EI is the ability “to manage 
ourselves and our relationships with others so that we truly live our intentions”—then the 
desired end state of the Global SOF Network cannot be hidden from potential like-
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minded partners. 135 Rather, the process and desired end state must be conveyed in a 
transparent manner and supported through consistent behavior. According to Piotr 
Sztompka, “trust is the precondition for cooperation, and also the product of successful 
cooperation.”136  Or, in system engineering terms, trust exists as both the input and 
output of effective cooperation, leading to increased social capital and greater 
interdependence. As SOCOM sends Special Forces personnel into the field to build the 
Global SOF Network, operators must embody the core tenets of EI to quickly establish 
trust with potential partners. Of particular importance are the traits and affective states of 
empathy, patience, and optimism. 
As a component of EI, empathy stands apart as integral to all four branches of the 
Mayer and Salovey model; it builds on self-awareness, facilitates thought, evokes 
understanding, and assists in management. As one of the most widely written upon 
attributes of EI, empathy is collectively described as the “fundamental people skill,”137 
and the ability to “tune into the emotional subtext”138 and to “fully immerse oneself in 
another’s viewpoint, yet remain wholly apart.”139  Empathy is an essential element of the 
communication loop, signaling both listening and connecting.140  Consequently, empathy 
is essential in influence operations. Indeed, as Malcolm Gladwell sums up the outside-in 
nature of emotional contagion: “It is possible to understand how some people can have an 
enormous amount of influence over others. Some of us, after all, are very good at 
expressing emotions and feelings, which means that we are far more emotionally  
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contagious than the rest of us.”141  Emotionally intelligent individuals, often classified 
psychologically as “senders,” epitomize empathy and influence through personal 
persuasion and their physical presence. 
SOCOM 2020 avers that “the vast majority of SOF expertise lies in the human 
domain of competition, conflict, and war. The Human Domain is about developing 
understanding of, and nurturing influence among, critical populaces.”142  Without 
empathy, a Specials Forces operator would struggle to establish common ground, connect 
with and understand his counterpart, and ultimately influence the relationship. Empathy, 
like other interpersonal skills and abilities, develops and matures through intentional 
practice and refinement. Martin Hoffman notes that mature empathy has a metacognitive 
dimension; that one is aware of empathizing, thus separating the distress for others from 
distress for self.143  Hoffman attributes the initial development of empathy to natural 
proclivities and the nurturing social roles of parents.144  However, humans’ ability to 
develop empathy, and, therefore, the skill to connect and influence, is not limited to 
adolescence. In fact, empathy represents one of the most complex emotional 
competencies, requiring continual cognitive appraisal to be able to walk “in another’s 
shoes.”145  Building the Global SOF Network requires empathic relationships to ensure 
understanding, encourage trust, and enable influence. 
A network perspective itself requires treating relationships as ties and links, 
symbolically depicting connectivity, influence, and energy. As trust grows over time, the 
consistency of those bonds thickens, strengthening the network and reinforcing its 
purpose. SOCOM 2020 further reminds us that “building trust requires time and 
commitment. Persistent engagement based on mutual trust and understanding best 
                                                 
141 Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference (New York, 
NY: Little, Brown and Company, 2002), 85. 
142 SOCOM 2020, 2. 
143 Michael Lewis, Jeannette M. Haviland-Jones, and Lisa Feldman Barrett, eds., Handbook of 
Emotions, 3rd ed. (New York, NY: The Guilford Press, 2008), 440. 
144 Ibid., 448. 
145 Ibid., 104. 
 49 
positions the force to build relationships.”146  This element of empathy over time 
underscores the importance of the second vital EI attribute: patience. 
Remaining patient in the face of one’s own foibles and others’ shortcomings, as 
well as towards the slow passage of time, is a cornerstone of special operations with 
foreign partners. Proverbs 19:11 states that “a person’s wisdom yields patience; it is to 
one’s glory to overlook an offense.”147  Wisdom itself is closely associated with 
discretion, excellence of discernment, penetration of thought, and correctness of opinion, 
and is reflective of an individual possessing a higher measure and balance of cognitive 
and emotional intelligence.148  In addition, patience is closely associated with 
temperance, one of Plato’s four cardinal virtues.149  Temperance denotes flexibility and a 
spirit of compromise, two supplementary characteristics essential for building 
partnerships within the JIIM environment. As the SOCOM Operating Concept notes, the 
strategy focuses on a slow and deliberate approach that “patiently informs, influences, 
and shapes the operating environment, thus setting conditions to prevent conflict.”150   
Patience also directly relates to self-control of both impulse and action. But as even the 
most emotionally intelligent operator working with a capable foreign partner will attest, 
patience is often in short supply.   
Aristotle offers another perspective from which to think about patience. The 
Aristotelian mean, perhaps best captured in the Nichomachean Ethics, suggests that the 
highest virtue is found in the middle way, forgoing both excess and defect. Aristotle 
contends that “to feel them [emotions] at the right times, with reference to the right 
objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way, is what is 
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both intermediate and best.”151 Thus, even within philosophy, achieving balance between 
the power of emotions and cognitive control is recognized as profoundly important. 
Patience results from one’s ability to appropriately respond through character to a 
dynamic environment, closely resembling the collective output of Mayer and Salovey’s 
four branches of EI. 
Like patience, optimism is widely discussed in both philosophy and psychology. 
As the third attribute of emotional intelligence required for thickening the Global SOF 
Network, optimism is built on the basic belief that we have the ability to impact our 
circumstances for the better.152  Optimism is the positive affective state related to 
confidence and hopefulness.153  At the same time, it is not blind belief; rather, it is firmly 
grounded in the conscious appraisal of stimuli.  In describing Martin Seligman’s work on 
learned optimism, Cary Cherniss notes that “optimists tend to make specific, temporary, 
external causal attributions while pessimists make global, permanent, internal 
attributions.”154  Recognizing the temporary nature of circumstances permits optimists to 
remain hopeful in a better future and committed to a cause. Although the scientific 
community remains uncertain as to optimism’s true home—whether within the realm of 
personality or as a measure of emotional intelligence155—one thing is certain: it “buffers 
people against falling into apathy, hopelessness, or depression in the face of tough 
going.”156   
Inevitably, SOF will not be able to transform every Global SOF Network 
relationship into one that is long, loyal, and self-sacrificing. Faced with rejection, 
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disappointment, and failure, optimism encourages operators to keep calm and carry on.157  
Neuroscience and EI literatures describe the left prefrontal cortex as the seat of attention 
and self-awareness, which functions like a highway for motivation. Specifically, the left 
prefrontal-based brain circuits  
quiet the feelings of frustration or worry that might discourage us from 
continuing. This means we can take in stride the inevitable setbacks, frustrations, 
and failures that any worthy goal brings us. We can see the hidden opportunity or 
the useful lesson in a reversal and keep going.158   
According to Goleman, these circuits are responsive to cognitive appraisal, which then 
requires Special Forces personnel to engage in intentional introspective analysis in an 
effort to rewire through neurogenesis pessimistic tendencies.159 
Empathy, patience, and optimism are essential to building the Global SOF 
Network, but they represent only a fraction of the skills, abilities, traits, and affective 
states of an emotionally intelligent operator. Ironically, military personnel in general lack 
these specific skills. In his classic cross-cultural examination “Defense is from Mars, 
State is from Venus,” Rickey Rife suggests that “they [military professionals] are not, 
generally, empathetic, intuitive listeners. Nor is patience one of their greatest virtues.”160  
Contrary to that assessment, the USSOCOM Operating Concept claims that SOF “master 
the interpersonal and social networking skills, knowledge, and understanding that allow 
them to operate fluidly within diverse non-Western societies.”161   
Cross-cultural competence is clearly pertinent to building and enhancing the 
network. Understanding cultures is inherently an emotional and cognitive pursuit, 
requiring a disciplined and analytical approach to studying such diverse topics as 
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historical contexts, facial expressions, and language. Yet, cultural differences can be 
extreme. Take, for instance, American deference toward emotionally sensitive leaders 
and Asian respect for emotionally tough executives.162  In addition to other cultural 
differences, often listed as power distance, uncertainty avoidance, masculine/feminine, 
and long-term/short-term orientations, scholars generally distinguish between 
individualistic and collectivistic cultural orientations.163  This difference alone is said to 
influence worldviews, expectations, and preferences.  
To highlight the difference between individualistic and collectivistic societies, 
Michael Spangle and Myra Isenhart contend that members of individualistic cultures are 
solution-oriented, prefer independent decision-making, approach issues directly, value 
autonomy, emphasize cause and effect, and express a greater interest in personal needs; 
conversely, members of collectivistic cultures are relationship oriented, prefer group 
decision-making, avoid conflict, desire social approval, appeal to authority, and express a 
greater interest in group needs.164  In terms of an interpersonal relationship style, Bernard 
Mayer suggests that members of individualistic societies are commonly “direct, 
ostensibly rational, and linear,” while members of collectivistic cultures are generally 
“indirect, emotional, and intuitive.”165 
Although cultures differ significantly, Mayer goes on to write that there “are 
continuities among most cultures, and these are what help us bridge what sometimes 
appear to be enormous cultural differences.”166  Bridge builders, those adept at 
communicating across cultures, who often do so without the aid of a common language, 
bond effectively over core issues with partners.  
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To understand this basic assertion, it is important to describe Mayer’s “wheel” of 
human interaction. His model depicts twelve distinct regions that serve to explain the 
driving forces behind human conflict. Mayer suggests that “the closer to the center of the 
wheel we look, the more cross-cultural continuities we will find, and the more we focus 
on the perimeter, the more cultures will vary.”167 Specifically, the likelihood of building 
trust and mutual respect is greater when we focus on our partners’ basic needs (survival, 
interests, and identity).   
 
Figure 2.  Bernard Mayer’s Wheel of Conflict168  
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Although neither comprehensive nor perfectly applicable in every situation, Mayer’s 
wheel equips Special Forces personnel with an intellectual framework to craft effective 
relationship building campaigns.  
Although intellectual study and cognitive understanding of cultural differences 
are key to building effective partnerships, equally important is one’s ability to genuinely 
relate to JIIM partners as individuals, not just as carriers of cultural tendencies. This is 
congruent with how Mayer summarizes the case for empathy, respect, and authenticity; 
he notes, “but all the good [bridge building] techniques in the world will not make up for 
a lack of genuine interest in what someone else has to say or the absence of a sincere 
desire to communicate effectively.”169   
It turns out that the EI skills that enable self-awareness and effective action, such 
as disciplined introspection, recognition of emotion, and assimilation of emotion into 
thought, are the same skills turned outward that encourage cultural awareness and 
appropriate response. Empowered by a genuineness of spirit and expressed through 
authentic interest, emotionally intelligent operators serve as bridge builders. In 
Gladwell’s typology, these individuals are Connectors—those who have a special gift for 
bringing the world together.170  Connectors epitomize the balance of emotion and 
cognition, and are gifted communicators. This is perhaps one reason why SOCOM is 
providing Yale with a $1.8 million grant to “monitor developments in neuroscience, give 
periodic updates on those developments and create a course that will improve U.S. 
Special Operations Forces abilities to communicate with members of other cultures.”171   
Communicating effectively with members of other cultures is enhanced through 
persistent presence or enduring engagements, which increases an operator’s familiarity 
with a different culture. However, persistent presence often comes with the price of 
stressed and strained ties with family. Of particular note, SOCOM 2020 recognizes the 
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need to “provide responsive counseling, medical, psychological, and rehabilitative care to 
institutionalize the resiliency of our SOF warriors and their families.”172  Positive 
emotionality expressed through optimism, curiosity, humor, serenity, and joy, are closely 
related to resilience, which is characterized by the ability to “bounce back” from negative 
experiences and by “flexible adaptation” to dynamic demands.173  Individuals who are 
psychologically resilient are also physiologically resilient, exhibiting faster 
cardiovascular recovery from negative emotional arousal.174   
In terms of coping, “finding positive meaning in negative circumstances broadens 
one’s scope of attention and cognition,” and results from cognitive appraisal.175  As was 
the case with optimism, finding positive meaning is not to blindly ignore reality, but 
rather it consists of cognitively reframing a situation to appreciate the current or potential 
benefits. A simple example is the reframing of an eight month deployment to focus on the 
ability to save enough money to buy a new family car, rather than dwelling on the time 
apart from loved ones. Although SOCOM is committed to providing “responsive” and 
“rehabilitative” care to encourage resiliency, one should question why pre-emptive 
training is not included in the current strategy. 
Such training, based on classical conditioning and extinction—the brain’s 
adaptive system that appropriately associates response to stimuli—directly relates to EI 
and Mayer and Salovey’s fourth branch, regulation and management of emotion. 
Intelligent regulation is based on three discrete skills: inhibition, discrimination, and 
adaptation to change.176  Inhibition is the ability to control or suppress an emotion that is 
already in progress. Discrimination, as the second skill, speaks to functionality and one’s 
ability to differentiate between when an emotion is appropriate and when it is not. Lastly, 
adaptation to change relates to the element of time and how some emotions may be 
appropriate at one time, but not at others. These skills are developed through numerous 
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training (learning) mechanisms. For example, emotional awareness coupled with 
cognitive appraisal and assent is learned through interactive situational environments, 
such as those employed by the OSS selection staff. Repeated exposure to such non-
threatening environments encourages individuals to reflect on their actions through 
introspection, dialogue, and peer-evaluation. Pre-emptive processing assists in the 
conditioning of behavior, equipping Special Forces personnel and their families with the 
necessary skills and abilities to remain resilient in the face of adversity. 
Although partially redundant with SOCOM 2020 and the USSOCOM Operating 
Concept, ARSOF 2022 outlines the skills and abilities particular to Army special 
operators required to thicken the Global SOF Network.   
C. ARSOF 2022: RECOVERING AND REVITALIZING THE FORCE 
The same intellectual framework of external drivers presented in USSOCOM’s 
2020 and the Operating Concept anchors USASOC’s vision of the force in 2022. 
Constrained resources, proliferation of illegal and covert networks, and other global 
trends represent some of the many forces that ARSOF 2022 takes into account. 
Consequently, ARSOF 2022 describes a world in which USASOC can “provide joint-
force commanders scalable nodes, with unmatched levels of tactical skill and language 
and cultural expertise, which establish persistent and distributed networks that provide 
the nation precise and nuanced asymmetric capability.”177   
This nuanced capability depends on ARSOF Soldiers being “adaptable, mature, 
innovative, culturally aware, self-assured, and self-reliant.”178  The August 2012 ADP 3–
05 further describes ARSOF Soldiers as “language trained, regionally aligned, culturally 
astute, politically nuanced, trained in mediation and negotiation, expected to operate 
autonomously, proficient at interorganizational coordination, and proficient with and 
enabled by application of advanced technologies.”179  Given that emotions are critical 
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components of nearly all of these diverse domains, developing EI through training 
initiatives should be a foregone conclusion. Interestingly, however, ARSOF 2022, other 
supporting Army publications, and this author’s personal experience suggest the opposite. 
Excluding personal counseling sessions and individually motivated study, the Army has 
yet to institutionalize a training program focused on teaching Soldiers about themselves, 
their emotions, or their ability to appropriately and effectively regulate and respond to 
their environments. 
In an effort to reverse this trend, USASOC is actively implementing programs 
that invest in human capital. In order to retain a decisive advantage over our adversaries, 
ARSOF 2022 posits that USASOC “will seek a variety of solutions to optimize our 
human capital, including: enhanced education and training and increased diversity of 
human capital. To ensure the health of our force, our focus will continue to be on the 
preservation of our force and their families.”180  Such solutions include the Tactical 
Human Optimization, Rapid Rehabilitation and Reconditioning (THOR3) and Human 
Dynamics and Operator Resiliency Programs.181  Such programs signal a shift from 
single to multi-domain training, and begin to address the glaring gap in USASOC’s 
holistic education of its operators. One such gap exists in developing self and unit 
awareness and accurate appraisal of ability. 
The current Special Forces culture discourages openness about inadequacies, as 
this reveals weakness and an inability to pull one’s own operational weight. The 
community is clearly aware of the stigma, and is actively pursuing ways to change this. 
Identifying personal limitations is the critical first step to avoiding operational overreach. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the trait that most discourages people from overreaching their 
potential and enables them to be more honest is humility. Confident humility involves 
being sure of oneself, while remaining continually open to learn from others. As outlined 
in the brief discussion of empathy above, listening deeply to and learning from others 
communicates respect, which is a precondition of trust. As Deborah Flick puts it, 
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“listening deeply to someone is an expression of generosity. Generosity begets 
generosity. An atmosphere of generosity breeds a sense of abundance, that there is 
enough for everyone.”182   
Self-assured and humble operators know and share themselves, talk about their 
lives, and are open about their fears and aspirations.183  However, it should be noted that 
self-disclosure involves a measure of risk, and, therefore, does not equate to blanket 
permission to reveal inappropriate thoughts and feelings. As cognitive assent is critical to 
emotional management, so too is carefully choosing what to reveal and when to reveal 
it.184  This appropriate disclosure leads to predictability, which is an essential quality of 
working with others—whether cross-culturally or within one’s own community. One 
particular strength associated with confident humility is an individual’s freedom to 
recognize “the need to change, without becoming defensive and denying the need to 
change. He is able to confidently and comfortably face criticism or rejection by 
others.”185  This strength is closely related to optimism and the sense of bouncing back 
from rejection and frustration. 
Humility is also an essential component of selfless service. Humility permits 
individuals to place the needs of others before their own, reflecting a depth of caring for 
and supporting partners’ needs. As USASOC strives to build and mature the Global SOF 
Network, identifying partners who share similar interests and are willing to work to meet 
U.S. policy end states is important, but should not represent the full purpose of the 
network. Equally important is the task of listening deeply to partners as they 
communicate their interests and needs, in order to lend subsequent personal and unit 
support of their desired end states. Submitting SOCOM’s service to partners’ needs 
would signal a shift in our culture toward honoring, rather than simply paying lip service 
to, humility and selfless service.   
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Caring for and serving others comes at a price, however, and is expressed in 
dollars committed, hours given, physical energy spent, and emotions expressed. Gladwell 
contends that “caring about someone deeply is exhausting. At a certain point, at 
somewhere between 10 and 15 people, we begin to overload, just as we begin to overload 
when we have to distinguish between too many tones.”186  Remaining aware of personal 
limitations may be one of the first steps toward reversing the current elevated rates of 
mission fatigue, apathy, emotional numbness, divorce, and suicide, all symptoms 
reported by active-duty SOF and their family members in a recent SOCOM-sponsored 
survey.187 Although no single factor exclusively influences psychopathologies, such 
elevated rates may be correlated to simply selecting the wrong personnel, or at a 
minimum, failure to increase EI and resilience through training.   
A second gap in USASOC’s education program relates to “professional 
development.”  The Special Forces community, at the level of Group and below, typically 
gathers about once-a-quarter to conduct a centralized professional development session. 
These sessions focus on such germane topics as interagency coordination and irregular 
warfare, and are generally presented in a less than collegial, dialogic manner; generally, 
an individual presents and a cohort receives, with limited opportunity for conversation. In 
contrast, holding a professional dialogue would encourage critical analysis, coherent 
argumentation, and would advance the organization’s ownership of the topic being 
discussed.  As Flick argues when promoting a culture of dialogue, “ideas flow more 
easily and our willingness to explore them deeply and non-defensively is heightened.”188   
A culture of dialogue was also central to ancient philosophy, perhaps best 
epitomized in the teaching and community-of-life styles of Plato’s Academy and 
Aristotle’s Lyceum.  Both philosophers felt that oral dialogue, not written discourse, was 
the more effective means by which individuals could learn about themselves, others, and 
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life.  Perspectives gained through self-discovery were tested through the fire of dialogue, 
requiring the philosophers’ pupils to master EI skills and traits, such as self-control, 
humility, and empathy.  In response to ancient philosophy’s deference for dialogue, 
Pierre Hadot’s observation that “there is no real knowledge outside the living dialogue,” 
challenges our individualistic tendencies and dependence on reason without emotion.189  
Debate requires logic and reason. Dialogue, on the other hand, demands logic, reason, 
and the interpersonal skills that flow from EI.  Dialogue also played a central role in 
assessing the composite intelligence of OSS candidates. 
Recognizing the need to gauge who was effective at social relations with 
dialogue, the OSS assessment staff created the discussion/debate exercise to evaluate 
candidates’ comfort in formulating and expressing opinions, while suffering the pressures 
of others’ criticism.  The following summarizes the staff’s description of an emotionally 
intelligent and cognitively competent candidate: 
Cooperation and good will marked the man with superior Social Relations.  He 
was tolerant of the expression of opinions with which he did not agree, and no 
matter how forcefully he might attack them he never did so with meanness or 
malice, and never with ad hominem arguments.  Just as he was fair in his criticism 
of the views of others, so he accepted willingly and pleasantly criticism of his 
own opinions.  He was patient in hearing others out, courteous and considerate of 
his colleagues in their attempts to present views even though they clashed with 
his.  More reliable than any other sign perhaps was a good sense of humor and an 
ability to laugh at himself.190 
This lengthy description highlights critical EI skills and abilities, such as tolerance, self-
control, patience, courtesy of others, and a sense of humor.  At present, the Special 
Forces culture is one of debate, not dialogue.  Arguably, dialogue-based professional 
development sessions, particularly in smaller groups, might encourage empathy, patience, 
and self-control, and other critical EI-related attributes. 
The emotionally intelligent Special Forces Soldier, one who displays empathy, 
patience, optimism, and humility, begins to resemble some aspects of USASOC’s 
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description of ARSOF operators. In the absence of an institutionalized training program 
focused on enhancing emotional intelligence, one might assume that ARSOF operators 
are selected already possessing adequate EI.  But—we might wonder—is this true? 
D. PRODUCING TOMORROW’S WARRIOR DIPLOMAT 
1st Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne), United States Army 
Special Forces Command (USASFC) is charged with assessing, selecting, educating, 
training, and developing tomorrow’s warrior diplomats.  Arguably, the most critical 
component of the “pipeline” is the assessment and selection of the right personnel, given 
the reality that training to enhance particular technical, interpersonal, and behavioral 
skills is easier than training to enhance character.  Poor character leads to poor decision-
making, which even enhanced physical and psychological fitness cannot reverse.  As 
such, special attention is given to evaluate the whole man by screening individuals’ 
performance, both in terms of behavior and cognition, to reveal character and 
competence.  In many ways, the assessment methodology used today to evaluate and 
select Special Forces Soldiers is the same as that used to assess the operatives, spies, and 
saboteurs of the OSS during World War II. 
1. Methodology and EI Testing 
The assessment center methodology used by USASFC today (1) organizes the 
assessment process around target dimensions, (2) uses behavior to predict behavior, (3) 
has two or more individuals independently observe and evaluate, (4) develops a system 
that ensures all target dimensions are covered and that uses inputs from multiple sources, 
(5) organizes a discussion so two or more assessors systematically share and debate their 
behavioral insights and relate these findings to each target dimension prior to reaching an 
overall decision, and (6) uses simulations to stimulate behavior to be observed.191  
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Although these components may be described in different terms, all six can likewise be 
found in the multiform organismic methodology.192   
However, one area of significant difference pertains to (2) using behavior to 
predict behavior.  Although the OSS assessment staff understood and depended on the 
fact that current behavior is one of the best predictors of future behavior, they gave more 
weight to their conceived personality as a whole measurement.193  By supplementing 
observed behavior with personality as a whole, the OSS staff was able to determine 
operational fit and increase the predictive accuracy of a candidate’s future 
performance.194  In so doing, the OSS valued the trained professionals’ projected 
personality over the standardized pencil-to-paper tests that rendered a personality without 
analysis.195  
Although USASFC employs psychologists to conduct interviews and observe 
candidate behavior during specific portions of SFAS, it makes heavy use of managers—
in this case other Green Berets—as the primary observers of performance.196  Using 
managers, not psychologists, as assessors, decreases the costs and time associated with 
the multiform organismic methodology, but may fail to provide adequate insight into 
germane psychological dimensions of the Special Forces candidates.197  To offset this 
discrepancy, SFAS requires each candidate to answer the 338-item Minnesota 
Multiphasic Personality Inventory 2 Restructured Form (MMPI-2-RF), which “assesses 
major symptoms of psychopathology, personality characteristics, behavioral tendencies, 
interpersonal functioning, and personal interest.”198  The question this raises is, do the 
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psychologists’ evaluations of the test and their limited observation of candidate behavior 
provide adequate data points to accurately predict personality as a whole?   
With an insufficient number of professionally trained psychologists to replicate 
the OSS methodology, but recognizing the importance of well-trained assessors, SFAS 
actively conducts assessor training that focuses on identifying attributes and the base 
motivations of candidates.  Although SFAS does not currently test EI directly, it is able to 
assess some of the attributes associated with it.  But as even the OSS assessment staff 
recognized, errors in predicting candidate performance are, in part, associated with the 
undervaluing or overvaluing of certain attributes that can either be falsely hidden or 
expressed during assessment.199  This problem exists for two reasons.   
First, candidates can purposely deceive assessors, saying and doing what they 
think will lead to a positive evaluation.  What motivates this behavior is difficult to 
determine; perhaps only the candidate will ever fully know the root cause of their desire 
to deceive.  Whether their motivations are benign or malicious, such that they flow from 
blind ambition or poor character, or even if the candidate’s motivations and character are 
prosocial in nature, the resulting behavior is the same.  Recognizing the Jekyll and Hyde 
nature of EI, Stephane Cote et al. assert that “emotion-regulation knowledge facilitates 
both prosocial and interpersonally deviant behavior by enhancing the motivational effects 
of traits.”200  Although science suggests that EI and character are independent, both EI 
and character remain critical variables that cannot be overvalued.  Considering that SFAS 
does screen for character through numerous other means, determining the motivations 
behind a candidate’s emotionally intelligent and effective behavior is less critical.  
Furthermore, a candidate’s peers are generally more than capable of identifying the real 
charlatans. 
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The second reason why assessors may undervalue or overvalue attributes is 
because some overlap exists between factors of personality and EI traits.  The mixed 
models (e.g. Goleman’s and Bar-On’s) “conceptualize EI as comprising elements of both 
effectiveness of adaptation (ability) and qualitative style of handling challenging 
encounters (personality).”201  More simply, the mixed models evaluate traits, not skills, 
as the Mayer and Salovey model does. Traits of candidates’ personalities, such as 
extraversion, are often linked to elements of EI, such as positive affectivity.202  Being 
unable to distinguish between the two makes separating an EI trait from personality from 
EI skill nearly impossible for the minimally trained SFAS assessor. Thus, it is likely 
necessary to exclusively adopt an EI test that is able to distinguish skill from trait, and in 
so doing from personality. 
The MSCEIT is a 40-minute battery, ability-based test that depends on consensus 
or expert evaluation for scoring.  Faking EI, therefore, is nearly impossible because the 
test purports to have right and wrong answers, requiring a certain level of skill to respond 
correctly.203  The mixed models are trait-based, self-report generated, and are moderately 
to highly correlated with personality.  Experiments show that participants given trait-
based tests, such as Bar-On’s EQ-i, were able to “significantly increase their scores . . . 
when motivated to do so.”204  Ultimately, only the Mayer and Salovey model acts like an 
intelligence measure, suggesting that associated skills can be enhanced with training and 
cannot be faked.  The MSCEIT enhances an assessor’s ability to distinguish skill from 
trait, and provides a tailored assessment of strengths and weakness, serving as a 
prescriptive training plan.205  
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However, and as is the case with any skill needing refinement, the presence of 
natural ability does not guarantee performance, nor the desire to train.  This reality 
reaffirms a commitment to balance, recognizing the role critical supporting factors such 
as motivation and leadership play in producing increased performance and enhanced 
EI.206  What remains, then, is to examine what factors are most important to SFAS and 
whether they relate to the historical example of the OSS. 
2. SFAS Attributes: Uncovering EI in Assessment and Selection 
Although the OSS assessment staff struggled to outline job requirements, staff 
members settled on seven general variables, all of which were essential to accomplishing 
the mission.  In a similar fashion, SFAS evaluates eight attributes reflective of the whole 
man.  Although the methodologies are similar, Table 1 compares the OSS variables and 
the SFAS attributes, suggesting at a minimum a semantic difference between the two.   
OSS Variables207 SFAS Attributes208 
1) Motivation for assignment (commitment to work) 1) Integrity 
2) Energy and initiative 2) Courage 
3) Practical (effective) intelligence 3) Perseverance 
4) Emotional stability 4) Personal responsibility 
5) Social relationships (e.g., team work) 5) Professionalism 
6) Leadership 6) Adaptability 
7) Security 7) Team Player 
 8) Capability 
Table 1.    Seven OSS Variables vs. Eight SFAS Attributes 
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For instance, while the OSS strongly associated emotional stability and social 
relations with motivation and endurance, USASFC fails to incorporate the emotional 
dimension in its definition of perseverance.  To the SFAS assessor, the perseverance 
attribute is defined as “works towards an end; has commitment; physical or mental 
resolve; motivated; gives effort to the cause; does not quit.”209  The focus on mental and 
physical toughness ignores the critical inclusion of emotions, and the role EI plays in 
perseverance.  Worth noting is that the OSS assessment staff concluded that a candidate 
with optimum emotional stability could devote his energies and abilities completely to 
the task at hand “without concern on his part as to how he was doing or what others 
might think of him.  He could consider the situation confronting him for what it actually 
was and would not be distracted by hardships, or frustrations, or the personalities of those 
around him.”210  The ability to remain focused on the task at hand, despite distractions, is 
essentially perseverance, and is captured by the Army’s current emphasis on resiliency.   
Further review of the four remaining SFAS attributes reveals a closeness between 
the concept of personal responsibility and the OSS variable of leadership.  To the OSS 
assessors, leadership was less important than emotional stability or social relations.  For 
the SFAS staff, personal responsibility means a candidate is “self-motivated and an 
autonomous, self-starter; can anticipate tasks and acts accordingly; takes accountability 
for his actions.”211  The first and second branches of Mayer and Salovey’s model—
accurate appraisal of emotion and utilization of emotion to facilitate thought and action—
involve being aware of one’s emotions and thoughts about emotions. Utilizing that 
information to effect a desired outcome is “essential for selective attention, self-
monitoring, [and] self-motivation.”212  Being responsible for self is, therefore, a basic 
outcome of judiciously determining appropriate action through assimilating emotion into 
thought.  Reflecting only the first two branches of the model accents the weak correlation  
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between personal responsibility and EI.  However, review of the final three attributes 
reflects a higher correlation with EI, and a similar interdependence as the three EI-
relevant, OSS variables demonstrated. 
The attributes of professionalism, adaptability, and team player isolate traits and 
abilities most representative of EI.  The SFAS staff appropriately includes “level of 
maturity mixed with confidence and humility” in the conception and description of 
professionalism.213  They go so far as to list “emotionally stable” as a subcomponent of 
being professional, illuminating the first true mirroring between the OSS variables and 
SFAS attributes.  Having already discussed confident humility and its connection to EI, it 
is necessary to comment only on maturity here.  Composite maturation of cognition, 
emotion, and behavior “remains largely dependent on an elaborate set of social and 
environmental factors.”214  Rather than provide a deep analysis of the numerous variables 
that impact maturity, returning to neurobiology may best serve to illuminate the process 
to any reader. 
Recall that the prefrontal cortex acts as the brain’s executive center, directing 
neural function after activation.  Preparing for a task is key to activation; without it, the 
PFC will not switch on in advance, lowering directed mental activity and reaction time to 
the physical response, which often accounts for ineffective behavior.215  Generally 
speaking, the OSS assessment staff identified maturity as being fundamentally a function 
of objectively analyzing oneself, and is one of the two primary components of emotional 
stability, the other being emotional control.216  Self-awareness and objective analysis are 
preparatory aspects of action, which encourage increased mental focus and result in 
effective behavior.  Maturity, meanwhile, is the result of increased preparation through 
objective self-awareness, which closely resembles Mayer and Salovey’s fourth branch, 
regulation of emotion.  Mature special operators objectively recognize the onset of both 
positive and negative attitudes, initiating preparatory mental activity to control and 
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channel the power of their emotions and thoughts into appropriate behavior.217 Basically, 
mature operators understand how to effectively and appropriately respond to their 
environments while remaining emotionally stable. Maturity leads to adaptability, which is 
also closely related to EI. 
In many ways, SFAS’s conception of adaptability is akin to professionalism.  This 
overlap is expected, though, as even the OSS assessment staff recognized the 
interdependence and mutuality of the variables surrounding a candidate’s control and 
expression of emotion, specifically those of motivation, emotional stability, social 
relations, and leadership.218 Adaptability includes the following aptitudes: 
The ability to maintain composure while responding to or adjusting one’s own 
thinking and actions to fit a changing environment; the ability to think and solve 
problems in unconventional ways; the ability to recognize, understand, and 
navigate within multiple social networks; and the ability to proactively shape the 
environment or circumstances in anticipation of desired outcomes.219 
In both cases, adaptability is the net result of emotion regulation in self and others, which 
reflects Mayer and Salovey’s fourth branch of EI.   
In their introduction of the EI model in 1990, Salovey and Mayer suggested that 
individuals adept at regulating emotion in themselves and others may “enhance their own 
and others’ moods and even manage emotions so as to motivate others charismatically 
toward a worthwhile end.”220  This is adaptability at its finest—shaping the environment 
toward one’s desired end state.  Certainly, thickening the Global SOF Network will 
require a full measure of adaptability, with special operators empowered to mold and 
shape the psychological battlefield to gain the trust and confidence of partners through 
genuine respect and mutual support, which is the essence of being a team player. 
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Selection cadre describe the ideal candidate as someone who is “able to work on a 
team for a greater purpose than himself; be dependable and loyal; work selflessly with a 
sense of duty; respect others and recognizes diversity.”221 A candidate motivated to 
become a Green Beret will temporarily place the needs of the team before his own.  The 
OSS assessment staff frequently lamented that their short 3-day course made observing 
authentic behavior difficult.  In sharp contrast, SFAS is currently nineteen days long, 
making forced selflessness more difficult to sustain.  Authentic behavior is habitual in 
nature, and is difficult to hide or change, giving the SFAS assessors sufficient time to 
evaluate a candidate’s true penchant for team work.   
Genuine respect, as a component of teamwork, stems from humility and the 
empathetic belief that teammates have intrinsic value and belong to one’s same 
community.  This belief inspires a sense of duty, requiring service to one’s teammates 
because they essentially deserve it, not because their behaviors merit it.  At the core, this 
loosely describes love—serving others’ best interests, whether they deserve it or not.  
And although philia (brotherly love) is seldom discussed within the special operations 
community, its tenets are idealized and followed.  This is the same type of love 
classically expressed in John 15:13: “Greater love has no one than this: to lay down one’s 
life for one’s friend.”222   
While the attributes of professionalism, adaptability, and team player resemble EI, 
the OSS variables of emotional stability, social relations, and leadership more closely 
reflect EI-related skills and abilities.  Despite the minimal differences, which are most 
likely semantic in nature, SFAS is aware of and is actively assessing each candidate’s 
emotional dimension.  What remains unclear is whether SFAS believes, as the OSS did, 
that emotional stability is central to a candidate’s overall suitability for special 
operations.  Although the high-risk operational environment of today is significantly 
different from what it was during World War II, and what it will be in 2022 for that 
matter, the importance of selecting the right personnel, those equipped with the 
                                                 
221 SFAS Crosswalk Attributes. 
222 John 15:13 (New International Version). 
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interpersonal skills and abilities to develop the long, loyal, and self-sacrificing 
friendships required to build the Global SOF Network, remains the same.  In an effort to 
describe the traits of the ideal high-risk operator, James Picano, Thomas Williams, and 
Robert Roland propose that such an individual would exhibit the following:  
Exceptional stress tolerance, emotional stability, and physical fitness; a high 
degree of intrinsic motivation, initiative, and competitive drive; exceptional 
reliability and integrity; and capacity for sound judgment and reasoning under 
stress.  Tough-minded and independent, these individuals may be more or less 
gregarious and interpersonally skilled.223  
This description clearly illustrates that excellence is achieved in balancing cognitive and 
emotional intelligence, which is firmly supported by sound character and physical 
strength.   
Therefore, Special Forces operators’ ability to perceive emotion, to integrate and 
assimilate emotion into thought, their knowledge about emotions, and their ability to 
manage emotions remains a fundamental skill required to build and maintain the Global 
SOF Network. As Admiral McRaven exhorts special operators to imagine what a 
networked 2020 will look like, one might stop to consider what that network might look 
like deprived of emotionally intelligent operators capable of extending genuine respect 
through humble service to partners.  Incorporating EI may signal the beginning of 
actually assessing, selecting, training, educating, and developing the emotional and 
interpersonal dimension of Special Forces operators. 
 
                                                 
223 James P. Picano, Thomas J. Williams, and Robert R. Roland, “Assessment and Selection of High-
Risk Operational Personnel,” in Military Psychology: Clinical and Operational Applications,  Carrie H. 
Kennedy, and Eric A. Zillmer, eds (New York, NY: The Guilford Press, 2006): 353–370, 367. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Don’t only practice your art, but force your way into its secrets, for it and 
knowledge can raise men to the divine.224 
 
This study has been propelled by the notion that balance between thought and 
emotion might result in increased capacity to build the Global SOF Network.  Detailed 
research discovered that substantial scientific evidence supports EI, that the OSS 
recognized the central importance of emotional stability—the forerunner of EI—and that 
the special operations community expects operators to already possess the skills and 
abilities associated with EI.  Although it was important to recognize the nascency of EI 
and the scientific community’s need to reach a consensus with regard to definition, it was 
also critical to highlight Mayer and Salovey’s four-branch model and the MSCEIT as the 
most reliable construct and test, making it possible to distinguish skill from trait and 
effectively separate EI from personality.   
These insights should inform the ongoing dialogue about the human dimension, 
and about the role emotions play in strengthening special operations personnel and the 
Joint Force of 2020. Since “EI brings together the fields of emotions and intelligence by 
viewing emotions as useful sources of information that help one to make sense of and 
navigate the social environment,” it would be foolish to ignore the potential EI has to 
positively influence the Global SOF Network.225 Broadening the Special Forces 
Regiment’s view to include EI will provide current and future operators with the 




                                                 
224 Ludwig van Beethoven, http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/501895-don-t-only-practice-your-art-
but-force-your-way-into (accessed November 7, 2013). 
225 Peter Salovey and Daisy Grewal, “The Science of Emotional Intelligence,” Current Directions in 
Psychological Science 14, no. 6 (December 2005): 281–285, 281, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20183048 
(accessed December 11, 2013). 
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effectively within the JIIM environment. The Global SOF Network will require operators 
who understand themselves and others, and who are able to develop reliable relationships 
through the toughness of truth and the tenderness of empathy and patience. 
As the special operations community strives to build the Global SOF Network, it 
would do well to remember Emerson’s assertion that “the essence of friendship is 
entireness, a total magnanimity and trust.”226  Genuine generosity of spirit leads to trust, 
which encourages a sense of wholeness and contentment.  This is the type of friendship 
that results in being long, loyal, and self-sacrificing.  Relating well to current and future 
JIIM partners is based to a certain extent on special operators’ collective ability to 
perceive, use, understand, and manage emotions in themselves and others.  Although 
pursuing EI promises to enhance essential interpersonal skills, as well as develop 
resiliency, it remains only one of many key competencies required to operate in the high-
risk, special operations environment. As such, one question remains: what will the special 
operations community do with EI? 
To begin with, USASFC might consider the following recommendations and 
areas of additional research.  The recommendations are preliminary in nature, and strive 
more to develop an appreciation and understanding of emotions than to institutionalize 
EI.  The recommendations are broken down into three general categories: assessment, 
training, and placement.  These categories reflect a basic belief that selecting the right 
personnel, developing them holistically, and assigning them to the right jobs will produce 
the most effective force.  The areas of additional research are closely connected with EI, 
and provide a fuller description of how the Global SOF Network may be assembled and 
maintained. 
 
                                                 
226 Emerson, The Selected Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson, 236. 
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A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Special Forces Assessment and Selection 
• Incorporate the MSCEIT as a baseline measurement of a candidate’s EI-
related skills and abilities.  The test also identifies weaknesses, providing 
personalized prescriptive training plans if a candidate is selected. 
• Formally add the emotional dimension to the attribute of perseverance, 
thus keying assessors into the complex, tri-dimensionalism of cognition, 
emotion, and physical behavior most reflective of the whole man. 
• Incorporate the use of a dialogue to assess a candidate’s interpersonal 
skills and abilities.  Current SFAS class sizes make it impossible to 
conduct small group dialogues for every candidate.  Initial focus should be 
on officers and warrant officers, and other candidates flagged for poor 
interpersonal competency or other psychopathologies. 
• Revise the current personal (self) and peer evaluation forms to include a 
section that highlights key EI competencies, triggering candidates to 
consider the importance of interpersonal abilities. 
• Conduct longitudinal studies to chart the importance of EI and operator 
performance. 
• Implement a periodic or event-driven reassessment to determine operators’ 
suitability to continue serving within Special Forces.  Further research is 
required to determine appropriate time windows for periodic reassessment. 
Event-driven criteria may include combat deployments, significant family 
trauma (e.g., suicide, divorce, or loss of family members), and prolonged 
employment in an imbalanced boots on the ground to dwell ratio.   
 
2. Training 
• Provide classes that introduce special operators to emotions, aiding their 
basic understanding and ability to perceive and assimilate emotion into 
thought and action.  Basic courses could be taught during the Special 
Forces Qualification Course, while advanced courses could be taught at 
the unit level.   
• Conduct situational environment tests to elicit emotional responses.  These 
tests should include a feedback loop, either through peer or expert review, 




• Provide classes on negotiation and consensus building, requiring operators 
to actively participate in dynamic role play scenarios. 
• Develop classes on communication and dialogue, equipping operators 
with theoretical frameworks on which they can build influence campaigns. 
• Revamp professional development sessions to encourage dialogue, not 
debate.  This will require institutional and cultural change, and may take 
years to fully implement. 
• Develop courses that aim at directly increasing EI skills and abilities, such 
as facial affect recognition, social cues, story inference learning, and the 
onset of both positive and negative emotions. 
• Develop classes on philosophy, demonstrating the close connection 
between how we think and EI. 
3. Placement (Talent Management) 
• Identify and assign operators with high measures of EI to critical partner-
based missions.  These missions may include operational or strategic 
partnerships, such as advising at the ministerial or national levels, or 
partnerships in sensitive or hostile environments.   
• Avoid defaulting to developing relationships based on rank or position.  
Although a detachment commander might traditionally advise a partner 
force’s battalion commander, the junior weapons sergeant may be able to 
relate more effectively.  Permitting this type of role-reversal highlights an 
individual’s and a unit’s confident humility and EI. 
B. AREAS OF ADDITIONAL RESEARCH 
A powerful complementary relationship exists among EI, trust, and networks.  As 
the special operations community begins implementing USSOCOM 2020 and ARSOF 
2022, a review of the trust and network literatures is imperative as it directly relates to 
developing partnerships.  The following sources and authors provide an excellent starting 
point to describe the interdependence of trust, networks, and EI, and their relationship to 
the Global SOF Network: 
• Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point (see List of References) 
• Albert-László Barabási, Linked: How Everything Is Connected to 
Everything Else and What it Means for Business, Science, and Everyday 
Life, Penguin Group, 2003. 
• Nicholas A. Christakis, and James H. Fowler, Connected: The Surprising 
Power of Our Social Networks and How They Shape Our Lives—How 
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Your Friends’ Friends’ Friends Affect Everything You Feel, Think, and 
Do, Little, Brown and Company, 2011. 
• Piotr Sztompka, Trust: A Sociological Theory (see List of References) 
• Patti Anklam, Net Work: A Practical Guide to Creating and Sustaining 
Networks at Work and in the World, Elsevier, 2007. 
• Deborah L. Flick, From Debate to Dialogue (see List of References) 
• Barbara D. Adams, and Robert D. G. Webb, “Trust in Small Military 
Teams” (see List of References) 
• William Isaacs, Dialogue and the Art of Thinking Together: A Pioneering 
Approach to Communicating in Business and in Life, Doubleday, 1999. 
• Karen Stephenson has made significant contributions to both the trust and 









THIS PAGE INTE7NTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 77 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Adams, Barbara D., and Robert D. G. Webb “Trust in Small Military Teams.” 
http://www.dodccrp.org/events/7th_ICCRTS/Tracks/pdf/006.PDF (accessed July 
8, 2013). 
Aristotle. Nichomachean Ethics. Translated by W. D. Ross. 
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.2.ii.html (accessed November 29, 
2013). 
“ARSOF 2022.” Special Warfare 26, no. 2 (April–June 2013): 17–48. 
Atwater, Leanne E. “Beyond Cognitive Ability: Improving the Prediction of 
Performance.” Journal of Business and Psychology 7, no. 1 (Fall 1992): 27–44. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/25092360 (accessed January 28, 2013). 
Aurelius, Marcus. Meditations. Hollywood, FL: Simon & Brown, 2012. 
Barrett, Lisa F., and Peter Salovey. The Wisdom in Feeling: Psychological Processes in 
Emotional Intelligence. New York, NY: The Guilford Press, 2002. 
Bok, Sissela. Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life, 2nd ed. New York, NY: 
Vintage Books, 1999. 
Bornhofen, Cristina, and Skye McDonald. “Comparing Strategies for Treating Emotion 
Perception Deficits in Traumatic Brain Injury.” The Journal of Head Trauma 
Rehabilitation 23, no. 2 (2008): 103–115. 
Brown, F. William, and Dan Moshavi. “Transformational Leadership and Emotional 
Intelligence: A Potential Pathway for an Increased Understanding of Interpersonal 
Influence.” Journal of Organizational Behavior 26, no. 7 (November 2005): 867–
871. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4093959 (accessed January 28, 2013). 
Brown, Robert B., and Ronald W. Sprang. “Human Domain: Essential to Victory in 
Future Operations.” Unpublished paper. 
Byham, William C., “The Assessment Center Method and Methodology: New 
Applications and Technologies.” 
http://www.ddiworld.com/DDIWorld/media/white-
papers/AssessmentCenterMethods_mg_ddi.pdf?ext=.pdf (accessed October 28, 
2013). 
Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020, 10 September 2012. 
http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/JV2020_Capstone.pdf 
(accessed October 24, 2013). 
 78 
Chambers, John W. II. “Office of Strategic Services Training During World War II.” 




September 6, 2013). 
Cherniss, Cary. “Emotional Intelligence: What it is and Why it Matters.” Unpublished 
paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Society for Industrial and 
Organizational Psychology. New Orleans, LA. April 15, 2000. 
http://www.talentsmart.com/media/uploads/pdfs/eq-what-it-is.pdf (accessed 
December 8, 2013). 
Conte, Jeffrey M. “A Review and Critique of Emotional Intelligence Measures.” Journal 
of Organizational Behavior 26, no. 4 (June 2005): 433–440. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4093838 (accessed January 28, 2013). 
Cote, Stephane, Katherine A. DeCelles, Julie M. McCarthy, Gerben A. Van Kleef, and 
Ivona Hideg. “The Jekyll and Hyde of Emotional Intelligence: Emotion-
Regulation Knowledge Facilitates Both Prosocial and Interpersonally Deviant 
Behavior.” Psychological Science 22, no. 8 (2011): 1073-1080. DOI: 
10.1177/0956797611416251. http://pss.sagepub.com/content/22/8/1073 (accessed 
December 11, 2013). 
Daus, Catherine S., and Neal M. Ashkanasy. “The Case for the Ability-Based Model of 
Emotional Intelligence in Organizational Behavior.” Journal of Organizational 
Behavior 26, no. 4 (June 2005): 453–466. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4093840 
(accessed January 28, 2013). 
Day, Arla L., and Sarah A. Carroll. “Faking Emotional Intelligence (EI): Comparing 
Response Distortion on Ability and Trait-based EI Measures.” Journal of 
Organizational Behavior 29, no. 6 (August 2008): 761–784. 
http://web.ebscohost.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=dff9b
b47-6508-437b-bbea-ac7c7ee6d3bb%40sessionmgr111&vid=2&hid=121 
(accessed February 15, 2013). 
Decker, Brian. “SFAS.” Unpublished PowerPoint slide show, September 19, 2013. 
Defense Strategic Guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st 
Century Defense, January 2012. 
http://www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf (accessed February 
22, 2013). 
Elster, John. Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989. 
 79 
———. Solomonic Judgments: Studies in the Limitation of Rationality. Cambridge, MA: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989. 
———. “Some Unresolved Problems in the Theory of Rational Behavior.” Acta 
Sociologica (Taylor & Francis Ltd) 36, no. 3 (1993): 179–190. 
http://web.ebscohost.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=d5ac4
d65-46c4-4856-b3c4-087768c3959a%40sessionmgr114&vid=2&hid=114 
(accessed August 30, 2012). 
———. Strong Feelings: Emotion, Addiction and Human Behavior. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1999. OCLC: 646747521. 
http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nps/docDetail.action?docID=10229596 (accessed 
August 30, 2012). 
———. “Rational Choice History: A Case of Excessive Ambition.” The American 
Political Science Review 94, no. 3 (September 2000): 685–695. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2585842 (accessed August 30, 2012). 
Emerson, Ralph W. The Selected Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson. Brooks Atkinson, 
ed. New York, NY: Random House, 1940. 
Flick, Deborah L. From Debate to Dialogue: Using the Understanding Process to 
Transform Our Conversations. Boulder, CO: Orchid Publications, 1998. 
Gladwell, Malcolm. The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference. 
New York, NY: Little, Brown and Company, 2002. 
Glenn, John M. “Interview: Father of the Green Berets.” Military History 14, no. 6 
(February 1998): 50–56. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/212596942/fulltextPDF?accountid=12702 
(accessed September 2, 2013). 
Goldsmith, Marshal, John Baldoni, and Sarah McArthur. The AMA Handbook of 
Leadership. New York, NY: American Management Association, 2010. 
Goleman, Daniel. Emotional Intelligence. New York: Bantam Books, 1995. 
———. The Brain and Emotional Intelligence: New Insights. Northhampton, MA: More 
than Sound, LLC, 2011. 
Goleman, Daniel, Richard Boyatzis, and Annie McKee. Primal Leadership: Realizing the 




Handler, Leonard. “Assessment of Men: Personality Assessment Goes to War by the 
Office of Strategic Services Assessment Staff.” Journal of Personality Assessment 
76, no. 3 (2001): 556–578. 
http://web.ebscohost.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=2791d
2d9–9ad8–473f-bd20-a7809bf7de94%40sessionmgr115&vid=2&hid=117 
(accessed September 3, 2013). 
Hadot, P. What Is Ancient Philosophy? Translated by Michael Chase. Cambridge, MA: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002. 
Helms, Richard, and William Hood. A Look Over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central 
Intelligence Agency. New York, NY: Random House, 2003. 
Hofstede, Geert. Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind. New York, NY: 
McGraw-Hill, 1991. 
Irwin, Will. The Jedburghs: The Secret History of the Allied Special Forces, France 
1944. New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2005. 
Joint Education White Paper. July 12, 2012. http://www.jcs.mil//content/files/2012-
07/071812110954_CJCS_Joint_Education_White_Paper.pdf (accessed May 15, 
2013). 
Joseph, Jacob, Kevin Berry, and Satish P. Deshpande. “Impact of Emotional Intelligence 
and Other Factors on Perception of Ethical Behavior of Peers.”  Journal of 
Business Ethics 89, no. 4 (November 2009): 539–546. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/27735210 (accessed January 28, 2013). 
Kahn, Jennifer. “Can Emotional Intelligence Be Taught?” The New York Times 
(September 11, 2013). http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/magazine/can-
emotional-intelligence-be-taught.html (accessed September 12, 2013). 
Kaplan, Seth, Jose Cortina, Gregory A. Ruark, Kara Orvis, Katie Engel, and Krista 
Langkamer. Emotions at Work: Leader Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities to 
Enhance Soldier Performance (Technical Report 1302). Fort Leavenworth, KS: 
United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 
2012. 
Kaufman, Mark D. “A Hermeneutics of Recruitment: The Case of Wordsworth.” 
Biography 34, no. 2 (Spring 2011): 277–297. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/903528325/fulltextPDF?accountid=12702 
(accessed September 6, 2013). 
Kidder, Rushworth M. How Good People Make Tough Choices: Resolving the Dilemmas 
of Ethical Living. New York, NY: Harper Collins Publishers Inc., 1995. 
 81 
Krueger, Frank, Aaron K. Barbey, Kevin Mccabe, Maren Strenziok, Giovanna Zamboni, 
Jeffrey Solomon, . . . and Vernon Smith. “The Neural Bases of Key Competencies 
of Emotional Intelligence.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of 
the United States of America 106, no. 52 (December 29, 2009): 22486–22491. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40536471 (accessed January 28, 2013). 
Lackey, Robert B. “Emotional Intelligence Training: A Missing Element in our Army?” 
Fires. July-August, 2011: 38–45. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/896467697/fulltextPDF?accountid=12702 
(accessed February 15, 2013). 
Landy, Frank J. “Some Historical and Scientific Issues Related to Research of Emotional 
Intelligence.” Journal of Organizational Behavior 26, no. 4 (June 2005): 411–
424. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4093836 (accessed January 28, 2013). 
Lewis, Michael, Jeannette M. Haviland-Jones, and Lisa F. Barrett. Handbook of 
Emotions, 3rd ed. New York, NY: The Guilford Press, 2008. 
Livingstone, Holly, Maria Nadjiwon-Foster, and Sonya Smithers. Emotional Intelligence 
& Military Leadership. Minister of National Defence. Her Majesty the Queen in 
Right of Canada, 2002. 
http://www.raf.mod.uk/pmdair/rafcms/mediafiles/225C29C0_5056_A318_A8A6
D465091F140C.pdf (accessed March 8, 2013). 
Locke, Edwin A. “Why Emotional Intelligence is an Invalid Concept.” Journal of 
Organizational Behavior 26, no. 4 (June 2005): 425–431. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4093837 (accessed January 28, 2013). 
Lynn, Adele B. The EQ Difference: A Powerful Plan for Putting Emotional Intelligence 
to Work. New York, NY: AMACOM, 2005. 
Matthews, Gerald, Moshe Zeidner, and Richard D. Roberts. Emotional Intelligence: 
Science and Myth. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004. 
Mayer, Bernard. The Dynamics of Conflict: A Guide to Engagement and Intervention, 2nd 
ed. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2012. 
Mayer, John D., Peter Salovey, and David R. Caruso. “Emotional Intelligence: Theory, 
Findings, and Implications.” Psychological Inquiry 15, no. 3 (2004a): 197–215. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20447229 (accessed February 15, 2013). 
———. “A Further Consideration of the Issues of Emotional Intelligence.” 
Psychological Inquiry 15, no. 3 (2004b): 249–255. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20447235 (accessed February 15, 2013). 
McKee, Annie, Richard Boyatzis, and Frances Johnston. Becoming a Resonant Leader. 
Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2008. 
 82 
Macmillan, Malcolm. “Phineas Gage–Unravelling the Myth.” The Psychologist 21, no. 9 
(September 2008): 828–831. 
http://www.thepsychologist.org.uk/archive/archive_home.cfm?volumeID=21&edi
tionID=164&ArticleID=1399 (accessed February 22, 2013). 
McRaven, William H. “Posture Statement before Senate Armed Services Committee,” 
March 5, 2013. http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2013_hr/030513mcraven.pdf 
(accessed May 14, 2013). 
Nagata, Michael K. Group Video Teleconference. February 26, 2013. 
The National Military Strategy of the United States of America: Redefining America’s 
Military Leadership, February 2011. http://www.jcs.mil/content/files/2011–
02/020811084800_2011_NMS_-_08_FEB_2011.pdf (accessed February 22, 
2013). 
National Security Strategy, May, 2010. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strate
gy.pdf (accessed February 22, 2013). 
News Staff, “Learning Emotions After A Brain Injury,” Science 2.0 Blog, entry posted 
November 20, 2008, 
http://www.science20.com/news_releases/learning_emotions_again_after_brain_i
njury (accessed March 17, 2013). 
O’Boyle, Ernest H. Jr., Ronald H. Humphrey, Jeffrey M. Pollack, Thomas H. Hawver, 
and Paul A. Story. “The Relation between Emotional Intelligence and Job 




(accessed January 28, 2013). 
O’Donnell, Patrick K. Operatives, Spies, and Saboteurs: The Unknown Story of the Men 
and Women of World War II’s OSS. New York, NY: Free Press, 2004. 
OSS Assessment Staff. Assessment of Men: Selection of Personnel for the Office of 
Strategic Services. New York, NY: Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1948. 
Picano, James P., Thomas J. Williams, and Robert R. Roland. “Assessment and Selection 
of High-Risk Operational Personnel,” in Military Psychology: Clinical and 
Operational Applications. Kennedy, Carrie H., and Zillmer, Eric A., eds. New 
York, NY: The Guilford Press, 2006: 353–370. 
Plato. The Republic. Translated by Richard W. Sterling and William C. Scott. New York, 
NY: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1985. 
 83 
Radice-Neumann, Dawn, Barbara Zupan, Machiko Tomita, and Barry Willer. “Training 
Emotional Processing in Persons with Brain Injury.” The Journal of Head Trauma 
Rehabilitation 24, no. 5 (2009): 313–323. 
Rehfeld, Rebecca E. “Organizational Trust & Emotional Intelligence: An Appreciative 
Inquiry into the Language of the Twenty-First Century Leader,” UMI 
Dissertations Publishing, 2002. UMO No. 3034480. 
Rife, Rickey L. “Defense is from Mars, State is from Venus: Improving Communications 
and Promoting National Security.” United States War College. 
http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/SOCOM2020Strategy.p
df (accessed August 13, 2013). 
Robbins, Stephen P., and Timothy A. Judge. Essentials of Organizational Behavior, 11th 
ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2012. 
Rode, Joseph C., Christine H. Mooney, Marne L. Arthaud-Day, Janet P. Near, Timothy 
T. Baldwin, Robert S. Rubin, and William H. Bommer. “Emotional Intelligence 
and Individual Performance: Evidence of Direct and Moderated Effects.” Journal 
of Organizational Behavior 28, no. 4 (May 2007): 399–421. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/30162566 (accessed January 28, 2013). 
Roosevelt, Kermit. War Report of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services). New York, NY: 
Walker Publishing Company, Inc. 1976. 
Salovey, Peter, and Daisy Grewal. “The Science of Emotional Intelligence.” Current 
Directions in Psychological Science 14, no. 6 (December 2005): 281–285. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20183048 (accessed December 11, 2013). 
Salovey, Peter, and John D. Mayer. “Emotional Intelligence.” Imagination, Cognition, 
and Personality 9 (1990): 185–211. 
http://www.unh.edu/emotional_intelligence/EIAssets/EmotionalIntelligencePrope
r/EI1990%20Emotional%20Intelligence.pdf (accessed February 15, 2013). 
Sewell, Gerald F. “Emotional Intelligence and the Army Leadership Requirements 
Model.” Military Review 89, no. 6 (November-December 2009): 93–98. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/225300131/fulltextPDF?accountid=12702 
(accessed February 15, 2013). 
“SFAS Crosswalk Attributes.” Unpublished paper, no date. 
Shelton, Jim. “Green Berets Training at Yale? Not Yet.” Military.com, February 22, 
2013, http://www.military.com/daily-news/2013/02/22/green-berets-training-at-
yale-not-yet.html (accessed February 24, 2013). 
Shipman, Amanda, Tamara Friedrich, Brandon Vessey, Shane Connelly, Eric Day, 
Alyssa Douglass, . . . and Gregory A. Ruark. A Model of Emotion Management 
 84 
for U.S. Army (Research Product 2011–03). Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States 
Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 2010. 
Simmons, Steve, and John C. Simmons Jr. Measuring Emotional Intelligence: The 
Groundbreaking Guide to Applying the Principles of Emotional Intelligence. 
Arlington, TX: Summit Publishing Group, 1997. 
Smith, Richard H. OSS: The Secret History of America’s First Central Intelligence 
Agency. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1972. 
SOCOM 2020, May 2013. 
http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/SOCOM2020Strategy.
pdf (accessed May 15, 2013). 
Spangle, Michael L., and Myra W. Isenhart. Negotiation: Communication in Diverse 
Settings. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2003. 
Stein, Janice G. “Rational Deterrence against Irrational Adversaries,” in Complex 
Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age. T.V. Paul, P. M. Morgan, and J. J. Wirtz, 
eds. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2009: 58–82. 
Sutherland, Ian. “The OSS Operational Groups: Origin of the Army Special Force.” 
Special Warfare 15, no. 2 (June 2002): 2–13. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/199354646/fulltextPDF/141DD0B7DB04402
E2D3/2?accountid=12702 (accessed September 3, 2013). 
Sztompka, Piotr. Trust: A Sociological Theory. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999. 
Tan, Michelle. “Frayed from War: Spec Ops Reports Alcohol Abuse, Stress, 
Sleeplessness.” Military Times (July 27, 20013). 
http://www.militarytimes.com/article/20130727/BENEFITS06/307270005/-
Frayed-from-war-Spec-ops-reports-alcohol-abuse-stress-sleeplessness (accessed 
August 5, 2013). 
Thomas, Glenn, and Michael Sahms. “1st Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group 
(Airborne).” Unpublished PowerPoint slide show, no date. 
Ting-Toomey, Stella. Communicating Across Cultures. New York, NY: Guilford Press, 
1999. 
Tomkins, Silvan S.  Affect, Imagery, and Consciousness: The Complete Edition. New 
York, NY: Springer Publishing Company, 2008. 
http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nps/docDetail.action?docID=10265325 (accessed 
September 10, 2013). 
 85 
United States Army. Army Special Operations Forces. FM 3–05. Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Officer, September 2006. 
United States Special Operations Command Special Operations Forces Operating 
Concept, May 2013. http://fortunascorner.files.wordpress.com/2013/05/final-low-
res-sof-operating-concept-may-2013.pdf (accessed May 15, 2013). 
 Van de Water, Marjorie. “Selecting Secret Agents.” The Science News-Letter 49, no. 2 
(January 12, 1946): 26–27. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3922783 (accessed 
September 6, 2013). 
Walker, David A. “OSS and Operation Torch.” Journal of Contemporary History 22, no. 
4 (October 1987): 667–679. http://www.jstor.org/stable/260815 (accessed 
September 6, 2013). 
Weisinger, Hendrie. Emotional Intelligence at Work: The Untapped Edge for Success. 
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1998. 
Winks, Robin W. Cloak & Gown: Scholars in the Secret War 1939–1961. 2nd ed. New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996. 
Yip, Jeremy A., and Stephane Cote. “The Emotionally Intelligence Decision Maker: 
Emotion-Understanding Ability Reduces the Effect of Incidental Anxiety on Risk 
Taking.” Psychological Science 24, no. 1 (December 2012): 48–55. 
DOI:10.1177/0956797612450031. http://pss.sagepub.com/content/24/1/48 
(accessed December 12, 2013). 
 86 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 87 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
 
  
 
